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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Increasingly, investors suing governments in treaty-based investor-state arbitration (ISDS) are 
turning to third parties to finance their litigation. In many cases, in exchange for investing in the 
arbitral proceeding, the “third-party funder” will be entitled to a return or other financial interest 
in the outcome of the dispute, which may take the form of a share of the award. Some funders may 
also have contractual rights to remain involved in, and potentially even control, certain aspects of 
how the case is managed by the investor-claimant.  
 
Litigation financing services can be attractive to claimants because they permit the monetization 
of potential assets embedded in specific, pre-award claims that are not easily accounted for or 
securitized. Of course, granting a third-party an interest in an illiquid asset in exchange for its 
financial investment requires pursuing the claim in order to realize the liquid asset. In some cases, 
these claims may otherwise be cost prohibitive or outside of allocated budgetary constraints of 
corporate (or in some cases, individual) claimants to pursue, and in others, financing a claim in 
this way may simply be the most efficient allocation of financial resources available to the claimant.  
 
Recent years have seen significant increases in the number of funders and the number of funded 
ISDS cases. 1  However, in many cases third-party funding of ISDS cases remains largely 
unregulated at the treaty level as well as under applicable arbitration rules. As a result, third-party 
funding in investment arbitration has increasingly drawn the attention of state trade and investment 
negotiators, arbitral tribunals, civil society, academic commentators, counsel, and funders.   
 
The increased use of third-party funding in ISDS raises various policy issues, many of which are 
unique to this specific context in which claimants are permitted to sue states in ad hoc arbitration 
(as distinct from the use of third-party funding in litigation or arbitration between private parties 
under domestic law or contract). Several initiatives have been advanced to identify and analyze 
some of these concerns, looking for example at implications for conflicts of interests, 
confidentiality, control of litigation strategy and settlement decisions, and the state’s ability to 
recover costs. Some treaties, arbitration rules, and domestic laws have implemented or are 
considering solutions to attempt to address some of these issues.2 
                                                      
1 International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), Report of the ICCA–Queen Mary task force on third-
party funding in international arbitration (2018) 4 [hereinafter ICCA-QM Report]. 
2 E.g. Investment Protection Agreement (European Union and its Member States and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam) 
(not yet in force) art 2; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (European Union and its Member 
States and Canada) (provisionally entered into force 21 Sept. 2017) art 8.1. Singapore has legalized third-party funding 
in arbitration pursuant to the Civil Law Act and has included disclosure rules pursuant to the Legal Professional Act. 
Singapore Civil Law Act 1999, c. 43, § 5A–5B (as amended 1 March 2017); Singapore Legal Profession Act 2001, c. 
161, § 71; Singapore Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, § 49A–49B. Hong Kong also permits third-
party funding and requires certain disclosures. Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, No. 6, (2017), § 98(U). For an 
overview of various trends in approaches to and regulation of third-party funding in investment arbitration see ICCA-
QM Report (n 1) 55-62, 102-03; Nikolaus Pitkowitz (ed), Handbook on Third Party Funding in Investment Arbitration 
(Juris 2018). ICSID’s rule amendment project is considering approaches to regulation of third-party funding, but its 
purpose is limited to conflicts of interest between the third-party funder and arbitrators and it will not address broader 
concerns about third-party funding. ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, Working Paper #2, Volume 
1 (March 2019) para 128. UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on ISDS Reform discussed third-party funding at its 37th 
Session in April 2019 and determined that the third-party funding in ISDS is a concern of the Working Group meriting 
  2 
 
While these initiatives have helped to shed light on the practice and inform the debate surrounding 
the role and implications of third-party funding in ISDS, many fundamental policy issues have not 
yet been adequately addressed, but are nonetheless critical to inform any comprehensive analysis 
of the impacts and implications of third-party funding in the ISDS context. This policy paper is 
intended to provide an overview of issues that are paramount to states and other stakeholders 
regarding the use and public policy implications of third-party funding in ISDS, which in this 
context is unique from other dispute resolution systems in critical ways explored below. It analyzes 
arguments for and against third-party funding in ISDS and takes a step back to assess certain 
fundamental questions:  What are the objectives of third-party funding in ISDS? What are its costs? 
What are its benefits? How do the objectives, costs and benefits vary by stakeholder? Is third-party 
funding desirable as a matter of public policy? If so, under what circumstances? More 
fundamentally, what are the criteria against which we should be evaluating its desirability? What 
information do we need that we do not currently have in order to answer these questions? Where 
information is lacking, what assumptions should be made?  
 
With more thorough consideration of these questions, states can better determine whether and 
under what, if any, conditions third-party funding is acceptable and permissible; and can consider 
what tools are available, or should be available, to ensure third-party funding in ISDS, if permitted, 
serves intended aims, and does not have unintended and undesirable effects. In some cases, it may 
be that more information is needed to answer these questions, in which case it is critical to both 
decide how to regulate in the face of such uncertainty, and strive to close knowledge gaps that can 
be used to improve policy responses over time. 
 
In terms of structure, Part II provides an overview of what is meant by third-party funding and 
how it is used in ISDS, and identifies the type of third-party funding this paper concentrates on 
and the reasons why it does so. Part III sets forth potential impacts of third-party funding that 
should inform analysis of whether and under what circumstances third-party funding of ISDS 
claims should be permitted. In particular, it proposes looking at whether and to what extent the 
involvement of third-party funding aligns with, or departs from, the core aim of investment treaties, 
which we articulate as promoting sustainable cross-border investment and treatment thereof. We 
focus on three main categories of impacts of third-party funding: Impacts on investor conduct, 
including decisions to sue and decisions to divest; impacts on the law and outcomes, in particular 
impacts on factors affecting win-loss rates and settlement decisions; and impacts on government 
conduct, including risks of deterring desirable government conduct. In Part IV, we set forth some 
considerations, options and issues for policymakers, and explore some of the barriers to action. 
Part V concludes.  
                                                      
multilateral reform, and will thus form part of the Working Group’s next phase of work in which it assesses identified 
concerns and crafts responses to such concerns. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-seventh session (New York, 1-5 April 2019) A/CN.9/970 (9 April 2019) 
paras 17-25. The report and audio recording of the 37th Session is available at 
<https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state>. The UNCITRAL Secretariat published a Note on third-
party funding in ISDS for use by the Working Group during its 37th Session discussions. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.157 (24 
January 2019) <http://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.157> accessed 26 April 2019. 
  3 
2 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN ISDS: AN OVERVIEW  
 
This section will consider what is meant by third-party funding, and when and how third-party 
funding is, or is not, used in ISDS. 
 
2.1 WHAT IS MEANT BY “THIRD-PARTY FUNDING”? 
 
Third-party funders (as the term is used in this paper), are investment funds. In the context of ISDS, 
the investments are the potential value of treaty-based legal dispute outcomes. In exchange for 
investing in the claim, such that funds will be used to pay the expenses that a claimant incurs in 
pursuing the claim and enforcing an award,3 the funder takes an interest in an eventual financial 
award on a non-recourse basis.4 A successful funder’s business model depends on deep expertise 
in understanding the strength of legal claims, appreciating how a tribunal is likely to apply 
applicable law to the particular facts of the case, and in providing expertise in case management 
and strategy, as well as in the enforcement of awards.  
 
Underneath these broad descriptive strokes, however, more precise definitions of what, exactly, is 
encompassed by “third-party funding,” and who, exactly, is a “third-party funder” are subject to 
definitional challenges. The “Report of the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding 
in International Arbitration” (the ICCA-Queen Mary Report) sets forth an exhaustive survey of 
various working definitions and applications, making more clear the reasons for which a 
universally accepted meaning continues to elude agreement.5 For one, quintessential third-party 
funding can resemble, be co-terminus with, or complement other forms of arbitration financing, 
such as contingency fee arrangements, or pro bono legal services, where services of value are also 
provided to a party to a dispute by an unrelated third-party.6 Further, insurance, whether obtained 
before a litigable event has arisen, or after the fact, can be obtained to fund arbitral claims. 7  
Relatedly, a wide range of debt, equity, and other risk-avoidance or funding models are rapidly 
evolving and continue to expand funding structures.8 While there are important distinctions among 
the archetype of each funding model, lines become blurred around the edges. Furthermore, the role 
of a funder and the structure and amount of investment made may vary significantly by claim. 
Some third-party funders may fund only a portion of costs, while others may fund all costs, and 
may become involved early in the process or much later.9 Some funders take a hands-off approach 
with respect to how the claim is managed, and some want to be more intimately involved in critical 
decision-making.  
 
Some analyses of third-party funding use a relatively narrow definition of case-specific, non-
recourse investment by an unrelated (non-law firm) third-party while some adopt a broader 
definition that also takes account of other forms of financing that are functionally similar and 
                                                      
3 Expenses paid by the funder will be capped and/or require funder management and approval. 
4 Non-recourse means that the funder does not have a right of action against the party to whom the financing was 
provided if the case is unsuccessful and does not have broader rights against the party if the amount of the award is 
insufficient to cover costs advanced. 
5 ICCA-Queen Report (n 1) 45-80. 
6 Ibid 36. 
7 Ibid After the event insurance, addressed later, is indeed looked at as a way to provide respondent funding. 
8 Ibid 36-37. 
9 Ibid 37. 
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provided in the same market for arbitration financing, including insurance products, legal 
contingency fee arrangements, or philanthropic or pro bono situations. The analysis below takes a 
narrow approach to third-party funding given the particular issues and concerns it raises.  
 
The narrow category of funding that is provided on a non-recourse basis in exchange for a success 
fee or other monetary remuneration that is wholly or partially dependent on the outcome of the 
claim (or a portfolio of claims, and excluding law firm contingency arrangements), as will be 
further discussed throughout this paper, is particularly problematic because of the ways in which 
it can alter incentives to sue, exacerbate existing disparities in bargaining power, financial and 
technical capacity, and affect outcomes of claims in favor of claimants. Other kinds of financial 
arrangements that are often captured by broader definitions of third-party funding do not raise the 
same kind of systemic and problematic concerns. For instance, with contingency fee arrangements, 
lawyers, like third-party funders, receive incentives to sue, and without those incentives, the 
underlying case might not otherwise be brought, especially when the underlying claimants are 
impecunious. Yet when pursuing and settling contingency fee cases, lawyers are bound to act in 
the interests of their clients. In contrast, third-party funding creates a new role for another actor 
(or, in the case of ISDS, a new financial services industry) acting in its own interests in pursuit of 
a financial award. Distinctions may also be made with recourse loans, which are secured by assets 
other than the potential value of the claim and are for a contractually fixed amount (i.e. not 
increasing with the value of any award), so a lender in that context would not have the same 
incentives to control a claim or push for any particular outcome. 
 
Additionally, with respect to before-the-event insurance, the aims of insurers are largely risk 
mitigation. They primarily generate revenue by collecting premiums, and seek to reduce risks of 
loss by, among other things, using their knowledge and engagement to minimize the likelihood 
that covered risks will occur or that, if they occur, losses suffered will be lower than expected.10 If 
a covered loss does occur, the insurer may directly sue the parties responsible for causing the loss11 
to recover damages paid,12 but such subrogation and recovery are not the industry’s main source 
of revenue.13 As compared with third-party funders, before-the-event insurers are not motivated 
by the same primary objective of securing increased damages awards.  
                                                      
10 Lise Johnson, et al., ‘Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (April 2019) CCSI Working Paper. 
11 The right of subrogation is also justified as a tool for ensuring that the relevant wrongdoers incur the costs of their 
harm-causing actions. But subrogation is not permitted in all jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, for instance, 
subrogation is only permitted against third parties that had been grossly negligent or had acted criminally. IBA 
Insurance Committee Substantive Project 2016, ‘Insurers’ Rights of Recovery (Subrogation/Recourse)’ (2016) 3. 
12 The extent of the recovery by the insurer may be more or less than it paid to the insured under its policy. The 
amounts paid by the insurer may also be more or less than the losses suffered by the insured. Different jurisdictions 
have different rules regarding who is entitled to amounts recovered in excess of amounts paid under the insurance 
policy. If, for instance, an IIA claim resulted in an insurance company receiving expectation damages through a 
subrogated claim, but the losses covered under the insurance policy were limited to a lower book value figure, who 
would be entitled to the difference between the IIA award and the insurance recovery, and what factors influence that 
determination? 
13 See, e.g., Daniel Ames et al., ‘Estimation Errors Among Insurers: The Case of Subrogation’ (2017) 40 J. Insurance 
Issues 159, 160. The ISDS dispute Kingsgate Consolidated v. Thailand helps illustrate these issues. Kingsgate’s 
political risk insurance provider had originally declined to pay Kingsgate under the policy. Kingsgate sued the 
insurance company, and the parties agreed to a settlement whereby the insurance company would pay Kingsgate 
US$55 million, a portion of the amount Kingsgate claims to have lost. Additionally, the settlement stipulates that the 
insurance company is to provide up to US$3.5 to fund Kingsgate’s ISDS claim against the government of Thailand. 
If Kingsgate is successful in its ISDS case, the parties are to share the ISDS award up to the point that the insurer 
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In ISDS cases, third-party funders represent an additional player with an independent interest in 
the outcome of the claim. Concerns about the incentives that different actors in the ISDS system 
presently have to bring claims, and for tribunals to provide expansive interpretations of treaty 
obligations and remedies, have been gaining increasing traction and have motivated important 
reform efforts. However, reforms have yet to think critically about the role of third-party funders 
and their independent impacts on ISDS cases and investment law outcomes.  
 
2.2 WHEN AND HOW IS THIRD-PARTY FUNDING USED IN ISDS? 
 
In order to assess and understand regulatory needs and options in the context of third-party funding, 
it is critical to first understand why, how, and in what contexts it is being or may be used.  
2.2.1 Claimant funding 
 
Claimant funding – i.e., funding for claimants to bring/maintain claims – is the arrangement that 
comes to mind when one thinks of a quintessential funding investment model. A funder sets up a 
(typically off-shore, tax-friendly) “special purpose vehicle” to facilitate its investment into the 
target asset, which in this case is the ISDS claim.14 The funder (via the SPV) and the claimant 
negotiate an investment contract, often referred to as the “funding agreement,” which, along with 
related documentation, establishes the rights and obligations of the funder and claimant, including 
specifying the rights the funder may have to certain kinds of information, the funder’s ability to be 
involved in certain aspects of the management of the claim (e.g. with respect to whether and under 
what circumstances settlement can or should occur), as well as termination rights of the funding 
arrangement.15 The contractual arrangements between the funder and the claimant will also include 
the grant of a security interest in the outcome of an eventual award, or other outcome-based 
remuneration agreement. 
 
When considering whether to invest in a claim, funders consider the following, the respective 
importance of which will vary by claim and by funder: (1) demonstration of healthy claim, (2) 
                                                      
recovers the US$58.5 million it paid, plus interest. Kingsgate will then be able to keep any amount awarded in excess 
of that roughly $120 million threshold (not including interest). Kingsgate reported that this arrangement with its 
insurance provider obviated the need for it to secure third-party funding to pursue its ISDS claim. Damien Charlotin 
and Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Australian Mining Investor Settles with Political Risk Insurer, as Both Team up to Pursue 
Arbitration Over Gold Mine Closure’, IA Reporter (18 March 2019). 
14 Notably, the creation of SPVs also has the potential effect of disguising the true beneficial owner of the SPV along 
with the identity and number of jurisdictions applicable to regulation of the ultimate funding entity, making regulation 
of funders and funding more challenging. Regulation should consider disclosure not only of the funder but also 
beneficial ownership and the relevant corporate structure. 
15 Domestic jurisdictions vary in their approach to whether and under what circumstances a funder may exert influence 
or control over management of the claim, with common law jurisdictions typically being more restrictive. Many civil 
law jurisdictions do not regulate the practice at all, although some do have regulations and/or explicitly tolerate it. 
Where regulated, current trends are generally becoming more open to third-party funding rather than restrictive, but 
some restrictions may be placed on its use. Some funders may structure a case to ensure that the funder does not have 
control over a case or claimant to minimize risks of challenges to (1) the lawfulness of the funding agreement (2) 
restrictions stemming from the law of the arbitral seat or (3) public policy concerns that may arise during the 
enforcement phase. Other funders, however, seek and structure deals to ensure that they have certain levels of control 
over the claim. See e.g. Pitkowitz (n 2) (Part II, Country Reports). 
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counsel that has been selected by the claimant and how counsel will be compensated, (3) the value 
of the claim, (4) anticipated margin of recovery relative to the budget for funding, (5) the amount 
required to be advanced, (6) jurisdictional obstacles, (7) available defenses, (8) the expected nature, 
length and type of the proceeding, (9) existence and implications of associated claims (e.g., by 
other investors in the same sector impacted by the measure), (10) the possibility of settlement, (11) 
the identity of the respondent, and (12) ease of, or particular hurdles to, enforcement.16  
 
Based on these criteria, claimant funding in ISDS is often an attractive proposition. On average, 
financing a claim costs US$ 5 million per side.17 The economics of the investment require a 
potential award somewhere around a 5x-6x multiplier of costs, meaning the minimum value of a 
claim that would be attractive to a funder would be somewhere around US$ 30 million.18  
 
Claimants, and funders, in ISDS have potential for a considerable financial upside if they can 
prevail on a claim, particularly given the hurdles for respondents to bring successful counterclaims. 
Of ultimately successful ISDS claims, the average claimed (removing outliers) is nearly US$ 300 
million and amount awarded just over US$ 120 million.19 In one case, a third-party funder made a 
return on investment of over 700 percent (over seven years) when it sold its stake in the ultimately 
successful claim in Teinver v. Argentina.20 Notably, certain kinds of cases, such as disputes related 
to exploitation of mineral or fossil fuel reserves, or to long-term infrastructure deals, have the 
potential for significant expectation damages.21 Awards are not subject to appellate review, are 
only exceptionally annulled or set aside, and are highly enforceable in most countries around the 
                                                      
16 ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 25 (citing B. M. Cremandes, “Chapter 12. Concluding Remarks” 154); see also ICCA-QM 
Report (n 1) 31 (“Case Assessment”). The authors also base this list on discussions with practitioners. 
17 Daniel Behn & Ana Maria Daza, ‘The Defense Burden in International Investment Arbitration’ (2019) PluriCourts 
Working Paper (forthcoming). 
18 ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 244 (Annex C) (“The group discussed the economics of third-party funding, noting that it 
costs about US$ 5 million to finance an ISDS claim, so damages must be at least US$ 30-40 million in order to make 
the claim financially feasible for funders.”) 
19  Behn & Daza (n 17) (including all claims analyzed, including outliers, the amount claimed would be 
US$ 1,476,000,000 and amount awarded US$ 472,795,000). 
20 Tienver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S. A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1 (29 July 2017). Notably, prior to the award being rendered, Burford Capital had 
already sold its claim onto an institutional investor. The creation of a secondary, institutional market, in legal claim 
investments is a stated objective of Burford. Burford Capital, Burford 2018 Interim Report (2018) 9. 
21  See, e.g., Richard Caldwell et al., ‘Valuing Natural Resources Investments’, in Christina L. Beharry (ed) 
Contemporary and Emerging Issues on the Law of Damages and Valuation in International Investment Arbitration 
(Brill, Nijhoff International Investment Law Series, vol 11, 2018) 293, 294. The authors recount that, according to 
UNCTAD data as of July 31, 2017, roughly a quarter of all ISDS claims were “natural resources disputes” relating to 
extraction of oil and natural gas, mining and quarrying, and renewables. The authors also found that the share of such 
“natural resources disputes” in the total mix of cases has been higher in cases filed since 2010, and that the natural 
resource cases that have been filed present “exceptionally large” damages claims. We come to similar conclusions 
based on a search of UNCTAD’s ISDS Navigator on April 10, 2019. The search indicated that most of the successful 
claims for over US$100 million are related to the extractive industries or provision of infrastructure. The search 
produced 60 cases, the majority of which involved investments in the extractive industries, or in concessions for water, 
sewerage, and electricity services alone. Additional cases related to telecommunications and transportation 
infrastructure. In these disputes, the tribunals often calculate damages by looking, inter alia, at future lost profits over 
the duration of the concession or expected life of the project, which may extend decades. See, e.g., Antin Infrastructure 
Services Luxembourg v. Spain, Award, ICSID Case No. 13/13/31, June 15, 2018, para 689-691, 714; Karkey 
Karadeniz Elektrik Uretim v. Pakistan, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/1, August 22, 2017, para 664.  
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world pursuant to the New York and ICSID Conventions.22 ICSID and UNCITRAL proceedings 
are reported to take roughly 3-4 years from initiation through to the issuance of an award23 which 
means a relatively short and concrete time frame for an investment to mature. Moreover, states, 
unlike corporate defendants in other fora, cannot declare bankruptcy. While a successful claimant 
may ultimately take a discount on the award (or sell the award on to another enforcement/collection 
fund or investor for a discount) it is still likely to collect something.24  
 
Furthermore when looking at the outcome of ISDS claims in the aggregate, claimants appear to 
have a good track record. 25 In roughly two-thirds of all claims, claimants prevail or the state settles, 
which means that in roughly two-thirds of the time the claimant walks away with compensation or 
another remedy.26  
                                                      
22 These are, respectively, the Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
(adopted 10 June1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) 21 U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York 
Convention], and the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159, art 37(2)(b) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. New York Convention awards may even be enforced when set aside 
at the seat. See, e.g., Alessandra Sardu, ‘The Fate of the Award Annulled in the Country of the Seat’ (2016) 17 Global 
Jurist 1.  
23 UNCITRAL, ‘Note by the Secretariat: Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS –Cost and 
Duration)’ (31 August 2019) A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153, para 54-59. “Initiation” as used above in the text means the 
time of registration for ICSID and the notice of arbitration for UNCITRAL.  
24 See, e.g., Blue Ridge Invs. v. Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 77 (2013, amended 2014) (noting that the claimant in CMS v. 
Argentina sold its interest in the award against Argentina to Blue Ridge Investments).  
25 It must be acknowledged, however, that it is difficult to tell much from basic win/loss rates. For instance, indirect 
or regulatory takings claims under US law, which are similar to ISDS claims for indirect expropriation, have a 
relatively low success rate. See, e.g., Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, ‘On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary 
of Lucas, Making or Breaking the Takings Claim’ (2017) 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847 (finding a 1.6% success rate for 
“Lucas-type” takings claims, in which the government is alleged to have wiped out all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land); James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, ‘An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings’ (2016) William 
& Mary L. Rev. 35 (categorizing different types of takings cases, finding low-success rates across the different 
categories (i.e., Lucas, Penn-Central, exaction, and other), albeit with some variations, and concluding that the “courts 
almost always defer to the regulatory decisions made by government officials, resulting in an almost categorical rule 
that Penn Central-type regulatory actions do not amount to takings”); Adam R. Pomeroy, ‘Penn Central After 35 
Years: A Three-Part Balancing Test or a One Strike Rule?’ (2013) 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677, 692 (finding a roughly 12% 
success rate for cases decided on the merits; the success rate drops to 4% when considering cases that were dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds). There are various reasons why win-loss rates don’t necessarily reflect how favorable or 
biased a legal system may be toward one side or another. If, for instance, there were clear, strict, and constantly 
enforced requirements for claims to be based on detailed pleadings backed up by facts, one might expect that the cases 
brought would stand relatively good chances of success; alternatively, if the door to the “court” or tribunal is relatively 
open, the win-rate might be relatively low. While the issue requires more analysis, it appears that ISDS claims are 
more of the latter, open-door variety, since there are no strict requirements to plead cases with particularity, and, as 
they have been applied, standards for dismissal of frivolous claims appear relatively weak. Tribunals seem especially 
reluctant to dismiss cases on the basis of initial complaints alone without providing the opportunity for further 
discovery and factual submissions.  
26 Behn & Daza (n 17). Some settlements do not involve monetary remedies but regulatory or other concessions. See 
e.g. Dow AgroSciences LLC. V. Government of Canada, Settlement Agreement (25 May 2009) (A US chemical 
manufacturer gave notice that it would challenge the Quebec Pesticides Management Code seeking $2 million based 
on alleged lack of due process in passage of the law and damage to Dow’s investment in Canada. Canada’s law banned 
and regulated the spraying of certain cosmetic pesticides for environmental and health reasons. Canada settled with 
Dow. The settlement did not involve a payout to Dow, but the Quebec government apparently agreed to a statement 
that “products containing [the banned chemical] do not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, 
provided that the instructions on their label are followed.”). Even nonmonetary settlements can have significant 
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2.2.2 Portfolio funding 
 
While funders may invest in single claims, “portfolio” funding is increasing. 27  A portfolio 
arrangement is one in which a funder takes a financial interest in a basket of claims, which may be 
focused around the same claimant, or around the same law firm,28 such that the funder’s return is 
dependent upon the overall net performance of the portfolio (or several portfolios) and thus less 
impacted by any particular claim.29 This arrangement benefits the funder as it is able to diversify 
its investment risk, and thus can also result in a lower cost of funding capital for a claimant, which 
for funders and claimants is a win-win situation. As IMF Bentham, a publicly-traded third-party 
funder, explains, “Portfolio investing allows costs and risks to be collateralized across the cases 
within the portfolio, with a commensurate reduction in return. Investment in single-party cases 
generally involves greater risk, given the binary nature of the outcome, but concurrently delivers 
greater returns.”30 
 
Moreover, the ability to bundle claims permits securitization and the creation of a secondary 
market in those claims. While institutional investors do not have the time, expertise, or 
specialization to invest in claims directly, the ability to invest in a risk-adjusted bundle of claims 
may present an attractive alternative capital outlet. Funders are actively seeking to create these 
kinds of securities to expand investment capital and mitigate funder risk,31 and it appears that there 
is already some level of a secondary market for investments in ISDS claims.32 For these reasons, 
absent any regulation, portfolio funding is likely to continue, and increase. 
2.2.3 Respondent state funding 
 
Respondent funding differs considerably from claimant funding because (1) under nearly all 
existing treaties states cannot initiate but can only defend claims, and (2) the possibility of 
counterclaims is limited. Therefore, states do not have a financial “upside”; the best financial 
position that a respondent state can usually hope for as an outcome is an award for 100% of its 
costs, with interest, and recovery for reputational harm (e.g. as a safe destination for foreign direct 
                                                      
monetary value, though it is unclear that such value can always be monetized and alienated. A settlement that 
exempted a company from tax liabilities or environmental requirements would, for instance, foreseeably reduce 
corporate expenses and increase corporate profits; other settlement terms, however, such as provisions prohibiting 
disparaging comments by, or requiring confidentiality of, the promisor may be of value to the promisee but difficult 
to quantify. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, ‘Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements’ 
(2007) 105 Mic. L. Rev. 867 (discussing value of confidentiality provisions); Amos v. Comm’r, 2003 Tax Ct. Memo 
2003-329 (US Tax Court, December 1, 2003) (valuing the portion of a settlement agreement that represented a non-
disclosure agreement). 
27 See ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 38-39. E.g. Burford Capital, ‘2018 Annual Report’ (2018) (which does not distinguish 
between portfolios that include ISDS claims and those that do not). 
28 Portfolio funding can also be structured around a law firm and its clients, but in these situations the funded party 
would be the law firm (and its contingency fee arrangements) and not the claimants directly. 
29 ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 47 (“One reason for additional complexity with law firm and portfolio funding is that one 
portfolio of cases can be identified to receive funding, while another portfolio is the basis for a funder’s return or 
securitization of its investment.”). 
30 IMF Bentham, ‘Annual Report 2018’ (2018) 14. 
31 Burford 2018 Interim Report (n 20) 9. 
32 Burford 2018 Annual Report (n 27) 48, 89. 
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investment),33 to be covered by the claimant. The profit potential that attracts funders to claimant 
positions does not and will not exist for ISDS respondents except in circumstances when 
contractual or other counterclaims exist. As a result, the economics of providing funding to states 
is a considerable challenge. 
 
Respondent funding is a conceptually distinct product when compared to many of the forms of 
claimant funding, as it is, in effect, insurance. 34  For example, with after-the-event (“ATE”) 
insurance or a similar kind of arrangement, if a litigable event has occurred and a claim has arisen 
against the respondent, the respondent and funder could seek to agree on the valuation of the claim 
– how will a tribunal apply the law to the facts and what will the claimant’s award be, if anything? 
Is the claimant likely to prevail, and if not, will the tribunal shift costs to ensure the state is 
reimbursed for its expenses? Is the lawsuit a $15 million liability? A $50 million liability? A $2 
billion liability? If the price of the downside risk can be agreed between the respondent and the 
funder, the respondent could then purchase a “policy” that would protect it against higher than 
anticipated awards. The respondent would pay a deductible for the expected judgment or 
settlement, and for amounts that exceed the agreed threshold, the funder would have a contractual 
obligation to pay. That obligation to pay an award or other amounts, such as an award for costs, is 
negotiated and context-specific, and so could be an obligation shared as between the state and 
funder based on various thresholds and permutations.  
 
As with claimant funding, funders may also find a version of portfolio funding to be an attractive 
option where the losses on the ISDS defense could be offset by another portfolio of cases in which 
the state was pursuing contract-based or other claims (likely in other fora such as domestic courts) 
with opportunities for financial recovery.35  
 
Where there are likely other ways of funding respondent claims that are being explored (or possibly 
implemented), third-party financing of respondent claims in ISDS seems to be, and will likely 
remain, more theoretical than practiced. Anecdotal evidence obtained suggests that in one case a 
funder and a state have agreed on a deal structure and terms.36 However, other examples have 
remained hard to identify and are of questionable existence. There are several reasons to be 
skeptical that respondent funding could be scalable: For one, states and funders may face 
difficulties structuring respondent-side deals due to challenges in accurately pricing down-side 
ISDS risk. Such a task is notoriously complex, which in no small part stems from the vague nature 
of substantive investment law standards, questions about the appropriate measures of 
compensation due for treaty breaches,37 and uncertainty and imprecision regarding the burdens of 
                                                      
33 Todd Allee & Clint Peinhart, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (2011) 65 Int’l Organization 401 (calculating drops in FDI associated with even ultimately unsuccessful 
claims). 
34 Jonathan T. Molot, ‘A Market in Litigation Risk’ (2009) 76 U. CM. L. REV. 367, 378; ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 23. 
See also David Chriki, ‘Investment Abitration Liability Insurance: A possible solution for concerns of a regulatory 
chill?’ (Apr. 8, 2018) Columbia FDI Perspectives (considering before-the-event government insurance). 
35 See e.g. ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 246 (Annex C). 
36 Ibid. 
37 See, e.g., Noah Rubins et al., ‘Approaches to Valuation in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Christina L. Beharry 
(ed) Contemporary and Emerging Issues on the Law of Damages and Valuation in International Investment Arbitration 
(Brill, Nijhoff International Investment Law Series, vol 11, 2018) 171 (discussing approaches to valuation and 
implications of issues such as the valuation date and indirect and consequential losses). There are also questions about 
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proof and production required for establishing the amount of damages suffered and owed.38 This 
uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that these vague substantive and procedural standards are 
applied by ad hoc arbitrators in a system that applies neither precedent nor appellate review; and 
this uncertainty manifests itself both through inconsistent interpretations of treaty provisions and 
damages calculations and through the rather large gap between amounts claimed and amounts 
awarded.39 While these factors and issues also give rise to uncertainty regarding the ultimate value 
of the claimant’s claim, the uncertainty may be less problematic for claimant funding than 
respondent funding. The claimant and funders might only need comfort that the claim has a value 
of greater than perhaps US$ 30 million, in light of and subject to anticipated litigation costs; with 
respondent funding, the task (at least with ATE insurance, but also with other portfolio structures) 
seemingly becomes the more challenging one of determining where along a wide spectrum a 
damages award will sit if liability is found. 
 
Additionally, if the potential funding is linked to a counterclaim or claim in separate proceedings, 
it may be legally, politically, and/or practically difficult for the state to enter into deals giving third 
parties a share in recoveries the state alleges are due it (or its agencies, state-owned enterprises, 
citizens, or other parties). For all the talk of defense-side funding in ISDS, the reality is that any 
scalable and systemic approach to providing such funding through the models that look like 
claimant funding models, or ATE-insurance-like products, appears unlikely at this time. 
 
Moreover, even if pricing and other hurdles to ATE insurance and other products could be 
overcome, the question then becomes one of control – if a funder is taking substantial down-side 
risk, or upside-interest in other claims, it may want a certain amount of control over critical aspects 
of case management, such as, for example, what arguments to raise, when to settle the claim and 
for how much. In corporate settings, where clear management hierarchies and defined corporate 
objectives apply, the granting of some level of control may make sense in some contexts. In 
contrast, governments, which have obligations to a wide-variety of stakeholders, have vastly 
different considerations. Whether and under which circumstances governments can and should (1) 
grant funders an interest in debt or liabilities to the state (or the state’s SOEs, subnational entities, 
agencies, or other constituencies), and (2) grant funders a role in decisions regarding how to litigate 
and/or settle ISDS claims, are issues that raise important legal and policy questions, including 
questions of domestic law, democratic accountability and the public interest.40  
 
The reality is that while the respondent may be able to manage and/or limit its risk, it will still need 
to pay something, and perhaps a considerable amount, to shift some of its otherwise largely 
                                                      
how these different standards apply to determine recovery that should be paid to different types of asset owners (e.g., 
the enterprise or indirect shareholders in it). 
38 Ibid 200 (noting that “some degree of subjectivity and uncertainty, while inevitable, is not a bar to recovery”, a 
statement suggesting a relatively flexible and loose burden of proof on damages). 
39 Molot (n 34) 380-81 (Hurdles to accurate down-side pricing in litigation as a general matter include: “The basic 
question of whether litigation risk is susceptible to accurate pricing or whether litigation is just too unpredictable to 
price. Second, even if one could price litigation risk given complete information, there are a host of information 
asymmetries and adverse-selection problems that arise because those seeking to dispose of litigation risk often know 
more about that risk than those who would assume the risk. Third, there are work product and privilege issues that 
must be addressed if information is to be shared with a third party seeking to price and assume litigation risk from a 
defendant.”) 
40 Lise Johnson & Brooke Skartvedt Guven, ‘The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of Democratic 
Accountability and the Public Interest’ (March 13, 2017) Investment Treaty News. 
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unlimited risk to a funder. As the average cost of defending a claim is US$ 5 million,41 paying for 
defending against claims, even if the risk can be limited, is not a small consideration, particularly 
as the number of claims against states continues to grow.42  
3 HOW DO WE EVALUATE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN ISDS?  
 
ISDS is integrated in investment treaties purportedly as a mechanism to advance, not undermine 
those treaties’ overarching objectives. It is therefore important to understand how ISDS, as a 
dispute settlement mechanism affects, positively or negatively, the treaties’ aims. Similarly, when 
evaluating third-party funding of ISDS cases, it is crucial to understand whether and how this 
particular financial structure and the incentives created by it affects the operation of ISDS and the 
object and purpose of investment treaties.  
 
In this paper, we work from the assumption that the object and purpose of investment treaties is to 
promote investment and shape the government’s treatment of it in order to foster the sustainable 
economic development and prosperity of state parties and stakeholders within them, not just the 
economic prosperity of foreign investors.43 In this sense, investment treaties are instrumentalist 
agreements with two levels of desired impact. Host states commit to provide investors certain 
standards of treatment in order to encourage investment, which is in turn intended to advance 
sustainable economic development. Protection of investors is not itself the policy objective of 
investment treaties but is viewed as a means by which a desired objective can be achieved.44  
 
Thus, employing the view that investment treaties aim to promote and protect foreign investment 
in order to advance a holistic notion of prosperity consistent with and supportive of sustainable 
development, we examine how the role of third-party funding may impact relevant investor and 
state conduct. Viewed in this way, it is important to consider the role of third-party funding of 
                                                      
41 Behn & Daza (n 17). 
42 A study by Behn & Daza counts 1,142 known treaty and contact-based ISDS claims. Ibid. UNCTAD’s Investment 
Policy Hub cites 942 known treaty-based claims (as of the end of 2018). Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator 
<https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> accessed Mar. 20, 2019. For a comparison of number of claims filed 
per year between 1987 and 2017, see UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New Industrial 
Policies’ (2018) 92. To the extent a respondent state has litigation insurance the overall cost may be reduced in that 
context. 
43 E.g. Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments (Republic of Korea and Paraguay) (entered into 
force Aug. 6, 1993) Preamble (“Recognizing the important complementary role of foreign investment in the economic 
development process…”); Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (entered into force Oct. 20, 1994) Preamble (“Recognizing 
that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the 
economic development of the parties”); Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments 
(Kingdom of the Netherlands and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh) (entered into force June 1, 1996) Preamble 
(“Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded to such investments will stimulate the flow of capital 
and technology and the economic development of the Contracting Parties…”); Agreement between The Swiss 
Confederation and The Arab Republic of Egypt on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (entered 
into force May 15, 2012) Preamble (“Recognizing the need to promote and protect foreign investments with the aim 
to foster the economic prosperity and sustainable development of both States”); Agreement between Canada and 
Mongolia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (entered into force Feb. 24, 2017) Preamble (“Recognizing 
that the promotion and the protection of investments of investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party will 
be conducive to the stimulation of mutually beneficial business activity, to the development of economic cooperation 
between them and to the promotion of sustainable development…”).  
44 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 140. 
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ISDS claims in, in particular (1) influencing investors’ investment-related decisions (including 
decisions to reinvest or divest, decisions to sue, and decisions to settle),45 (2) shaping the contours 
of investment law and outcomes in particular cases, and (3) influencing governments’ willingness 
and ability to regulate investment in order to advance sustainable development aims. We consider 
those issues below.  
 
3.1 IMPACTS OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING ON INVESTOR DECISIONS AND CONDUCT 
 
This section looks at three different implications that third-party funding may have for investor 
conduct. These are how third-party funding may affect  
 
• the number of cases that are brought;  
• the nature and motives of the claimant; and 
• investors’ decisions to remain engaged in the host-country or exit.   
3.1.1 The number of cases  
 
Legal dispute funders create a market for litigation46 risk where there was none by allowing a party 
to monetize its illiquid interest in the outcome of a claim. Relatedly, funders also enable would-be 
litigants who do not wish to bear litigation risk to transfer some or all risk to the funder. Indeed, a 
funder’s business model is entirely based on bearing litigation risk in exchange for rights to a 
financial upside.  
 
While third-party funding is often portrayed as a means of providing access to justice for claimants 
who would not otherwise have funds to seek a remedy, in many and a growing number of cases, 
claimants seek funding not because they are impecunious but because they wish to pursue claims 
with as little impact on cash flows, and as great a chance of success, as possible.47 These well-
resourced and sophisticated claimants may seek to manage risk, may not have budgeted for the 
anticipated expenditure on the claim, may otherwise be seeking to reduce legal budgets or “turn 
legal departments into profit centers,” 48  or may wish to take “off-balance sheet” the cost of 
pursuing legal claims. Financing a claim via a third-party funding model permits funds that may 
otherwise be used for litigation/arbitration to be reinvested or put to use to expand business growth 
and opportunities.49 
 
                                                      
45 The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (Karl Sauvant & Lisa Sachs eds) (Oxford University Press 
2009); Joachim Pohl, ‘Societal Benefits and Costs of International Investment Agreements’ (2018) OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment, Working Paper No. 2018/1; Emma Aisbett, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation’ (2007) CUDARE Working Papers No. 1032, 2007; Lise 
Johnson et al., ‘Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations for States’ (Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment 2018); Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2017). 
46 We use the term “litigation” here to also include arbitration. 
47 ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 20. 
48 Ibid 21 (Setting forth the reasons for which claimants may seek out third-party funding: “As an alternative to tying 
up their own capital in litigation or arbitration, corporations can use dispute funding to pursue arbitrations that can 
help transition their in-house legal departments from cost centres to profit centres.”). 
49 Ibid 20. 
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Third-party funding, in short, can reduce the risk and costs claimants would otherwise face when 
bringing an ISDS claim. Consequently, third-party funding may tilt decision-making frameworks 
in favor of arbitration and can result in investors pursuing claims that absent such funding, they 
would have otherwise been unwilling or unable to pursue. This, in short, likely means that third-
party funding will result in more ISDS claims being brought than would be if that funding were 
not available. Although, due to challenges of data availability, studies of the effects of third-party 
funding on the amount of claims filed are limited, available research suggests that litigation finance 
does in fact drive up the number of cases brought.50 Indeed, this effect of third-party funding in 
ISDS also seems to be acknowledged by funders, claimants’ counsel, and claimants, who contend 
third-party funding is important for access to justice as, without it, at least some claims might 
otherwise not be advanced.51  
 
Yet while third-party funding can make it possible or more attractive for investors to bring ISDS 
claims, it is important to highlight that access to ISDS is not synonymous with access to justice 
and, even if it were, access to third-party funding is not necessarily the most appropriate “access 
to justice” tool. For one, while there may very well be some cases in which the funder truly 
facilitates the ability to access a system of legal adjudication when no other effective remedy is 
available, in most cases ISDS is not the only procedural mechanism available to investors, nor are 
IIAs their only sources of substantive protections.52 Normative conceptions of access to justice 
and right to an effective remedy do not mean that parties have an absolute right to their most 
outcome- or cost-preferred remedy.53 Taking this broader view, other than in cases where domestic 
or other remedies have been exhausted or are actually unavailable, claims that third-party funding 
                                                      
50 Daniel L. Chen, Can Markets Stimulate Rights? On the Alienability of Legal Claims (2015) 46 RAND J. of 
Economics 23, 25, 33 (using data from a litigation funder in Australia); see also David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, 
A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding (2013) 15 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1075, 
1078 (noting that funders may result in more claims being brought as they can play a role in communicating to potential 
claimants or firms that claims may exist).  
51 See, e.g., Norton Rose Fulbright, International Arbitration, Issue 7 (September 2016) 3, 9, 11; see also Chen (n 50) 
33. 
52 Investors that benefit from IIA protections also likely have access to domestic courts and have the ability to pursue 
a remedy in the same way that domestic investors and other foreign investors who do not have access to IIA protection 
may. Based on claims filed and breaches found to date, there have been only a handful of successful claims of 
discrimination against foreign investors, and a similarly small set of successful claims for denials of justice. This 
indicates that investors are actually not using ISDS to allege systemic inadequacy of or bias in domestic courts, 
notwithstanding that those flaws are often cited as reasons why ISDS is important. See, e.g., Jarrod Hepburn, ‘2018 
Developments in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2018 (Lisa 
Sachs, Lise Johnson, and Jesse Coleman, eds) (Oxford University Press 2019 (forthcoming)); research on non-
discrimination is on file with authors. Moreover, the denial of justice in domestic courts is, of course, its own 
international legal claim both in international investment law, but also in international human rights fora (some of 
which are open to claims by corporate entities). See, e.g., Lise Johnson et al., Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (n 10) 11-14.  
53 Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest, and U.S. Domestic 
Law’ (May 2015) CCSI Policy Paper 7–15 (setting forth examples of how and in which circumstances investment 
treaty protections, as enforced through ISDS, offer greater substantive rights to foreign investors in the United States 
when compared to otherwise applicable US law, and how procedural rights available through ISDS also lead to greater 
substantive rights as applied); Francesco Francioni, ‘The Right of Access to Justice under Customary International 
Law’ in Francesco Francioni (ed) Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford University Press 2007) 1-55, 33-54 
(discussing circumstances under which access to justice may be restricted, and how to evaluate those circumstances, 
including: whether restrictions are assessed on the basis of reasonableness, whether the restriction has legitimate aims, 
whether the means used are proportionate to the legitimate aim, among others). 
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supports “access to justice” are more accurately stated as claims that third-party funding supports 
“access to ISDS.”  
 
Furthermore, third-party funding is far from the only way to ensure that even impecunious 
investors are provided an effective remedy for actual loss. There are, for instance, financing 
mechanisms that operate in the same or similar market as third-party funding and may be available 
in situations of impecuniosity, even if on a more limited basis, such as contingency fee 
arrangements. 54  Additionally, there are a variety of public and private entities that provide 
investment support, including political risk insurance. Ex ante risk insurance, such as that provided 
by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, domestic insurance entities (e.g. 
the United States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation), and private risk insurers cover many 
situations that would also be covered by investment treaty standards.55 And, as noted below, these 
supports may not raise the same concerns as third-party funding that takes a contingent interest in 
the outcome of litigation.   
 
Additionally, as indicated above, claimants reportedly often seek funding not because they are 
impecunious but because of other benefits that funding can offer, such as enabling claimants to 
take legal costs off their balance sheets and to access the resources, know-how, networks and case 
management expertise of the third-party funder, akin to a legal management consultant, can 
provide. The use of third-party funding by non-impecunious claimants to manage balance sheets 
and improve chances of success are not necessarily negative, but also are not “access to justice” 
as that term is commonly understood. This is relevant to a cost-benefit analysis of the overall 
importance of third-party funding to claimants and its impacts on respondent states and other 
stakeholders.56 If access to justice is being asserted as a rational for the use of third-party funding 
in ISDS, it is critical for policymakers to understand in what kind of circumstances claimants 
actually require this kind of critical assistance, and whether third-party funding is the only or, in 
light of the policy considerations raised in this paper, even most desirable way to facilitate access 
to an effective remedy. Empirical evidence as to why and under what circumstances third-party 
funding is used - evidence that is known and held by funders but not shared publicly - is critical to 
analyzing the costs and benefits of third-party funding and crafting policy responses, such as 
informing decisions on whether and how to regulate or ban it.  
 
Overall, arguments that third-party funding is solving true access to justice problems appear at 
present to be more rhetoric than reality. Funders are best-placed to offer examples and data to 
demonstrate otherwise, but that information remains elusive. Rather, it appears that funders are 
                                                      
54 In some cases, third-party funding interacts with these other financing mechanisms in ways that makes them more 
broadly available. 
55 Importantly, these entities incorporate screening and other mechanisms to help to ensure that beneficiaries are 
contributing to and not undermining various social, environmental, and human rights norms in the process of their 
investment. Investment treaties, on the other hand, are agnostic on these issues, protecting all covered investment 
regardless of its negative social, environmental, or human rights impacts on the home (e.g. offshoring of jobs or taxes) 
or host (e.g. environmental pollution) state. These kinds of mechanisms may be more attractive than the ex ante 
reliance on ISDS protections if the objective is a holistic conception of “justice.” Investment treaties are effectively 
free political risk insurance from the perspective of the investor. See, e.g., Lise Johnson et al., Alternatives to Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (n 10) 5-7. 
56 Tara Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett, ‘Third Party Funding in Investment Arbitration: Misappropriation of Access 
to Justice Rhetoric by Global Speculative Finance’ (2019) 60(9) Boston College L. Rev. 
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financing claims to pursue their own profit motives, and claimants are contracting with them for 
diverse financial and strategic purposes.  
 
While funders’ profit-seeking objective is not inherently objectionable and can produce beneficial 
spillovers by facilitating certain kinds of claims or leveling playing fields in certain asymmetrical 
contexts, it is also relatively uncontroversial to note that governments do not, need not, and should 
not necessarily sanction all profit-seeking or litigation-backing activities. In fact, and as discussed 
below, at least some governments have determined that they will not permit the existence of such 
litigation finance schemes when those schemes involve acquiring interests in claims against the 
government, in contrast to whether or not third-party funding is otherwise generally permitted 
within the jurisdiction. The rationale for and mode of restricting third-party funding in claims 
against the government is explained below.   
3.1.2 The nature and motives of the claimant 
 
Analyses of policy considerations of third-party funding in ISDS typically look, at some point, to 
comparisons with general domestic jurisdictions’ treatment of and trends in third-party funding 
and its regulation. For example, in many civil law countries, the practice may be relatively new 
and/or unregulated, or may be expressly authorized.57  In contrast, common law jurisdictions 
historically prohibited maintenance, or the support of litigation by another party who lacks a 
legitimate interest in the lawsuit, and champerty, akin to maintenance but with the specific feature 
of supporting the litigation in exchange for a return of a share of the proceeds. These legal 
regulations grew out of a desire to prevent the wealthy or powerful from using the medieval 
English legal system to gain material wealth by putting power behind unmeritorious or socially 
undesirable claims.58  
 
As judicial independence grew, some scholars and jurisdictions began to view these common law 
limitations as unnecessary. 59  While some common law jurisdictions, such as Ireland, 60  have 
strongly maintained maintenance and champerty as criminal and tort offenses, others have 
eliminated prohibitions under criminal law, while retaining it under tort, and others have carved 
out certain areas where third-party funding is permitted but regulated.61 These jurisdictions have 
done so in order to advance identified policy goals, such as closing gaps in access to justice for 
certain types of claimants or cases. Where such deregulatory steps have been taken, they are often 
accompanied by analysis and balancing of competing considerations. For example, many 
jurisdictions may permit third-party funding in some or all cases, but may still view as problematic 
and thus regulate certain aspects of the funded claim or the funder, such as situations in which a 
                                                      
57 Pitkowitz (n 2) Part II: Country Reports (e.g. Brazil has no rules on third-party funding, but it is regulated within 
the broader context of financial services regulation; third-party funding is recognized as validly practiced in France; 
third-party funding in Germany is largely unregulated; the Netherlands does not have specific rules on third-party 
funding but the parliament is discussing what rules should apply within the broader context of allowing the practice) 
58 Michael K. Velchik & Jeffrey Y. Zhang, ‘Islands of Litigation Finance’ (April 25, 2017) John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics, and Business, Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 71, 10–12. 
59 Ibid 12. 
60 Persona Digital Telephone Ltd. and Sigma Wireless Networks Ltd v The Minister for Public Enterprise & Ors 
[2017] IESC 27 (Ir). 
61 See e.g., Nikolaus Pitkowitz, ‘The TPF Handbook’ in Pitkowitz (n 2); Aaron Katz & Steven Schoenfeld, ‘Third 
Party Litigation Financing in the US’ (2018) WestLaw, Practical Law, Resource ID 5-518-1314 (discussing 
approaches to and rules surrounding litigation financing in US jurisdictions). 
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funder could influence or control the management of a funded case during the course of 
proceedings.62 
 
While it is generally asserted that the trend is in liberalizing, not tightening restrictions on third-
party funding (in some cases where funders have themselves lobbied for such changes),63 there are 
examples of jurisdictions that are seeking to regulate third-party funding in contexts where it 
simply is not currently regulated but concerns about the practice have emerged.64  
 
Yet these broad trends are not necessarily instructive for considering more discrete questions 
relating to the use of third-party funding in ISDS. The use of third-party funding in such cases is 
a separate issue that merits distinct treatment from the use of third-party funding in, for instance, 
corporate or tort disputes between private parties. Thus, rather than looking just at overall trends, 
it is important to examine the more specific questions of whether, to what extent, and why/why 
not governments permit third-party funding of domestic legal claims against themselves. Studies 
looking at third-party funding, however, generally do not look at the specific question of whether 
and to what extent the practice is regulated in the specific context of claims against the government. 
The next section looks at that issue, focusing on the specific case of third-party funding of claims 
against the US government.  
 
Third-party funded claims against Governments 
 
Governments often craft rules and mechanisms aiming to enable and encourage suits against their 
agencies, entities and officials. They do this in order to hold relevant actors and institutions 
accountable for harms and deter future wrongful conduct, and/or to provide compensation and 
other remedies to victims.65 This openness to suit, however, is also often accompanied by limits 
designed to serve other policy goals, such as avoiding overdeterrence, curbing frivolous  and 
speculative claims, safeguarding public resources, and managing litigation costs and 
effectiveness.66 The rules can be complex, as policy questions relevant to the balance to be struck 
between supporting or restricting suits against the government are myriad and often competing. If, 
for example, governments want to affirmatively encourage efforts to sue their entities and/or 
officials for harms, they may consider such issues as the degree of fault (which may lie along a 
spectrum from strict liability, to negligence, to intentional violation of the law) and the nature of 
the harms (e.g., from harm to economic interests to violations of rights to life and liberty, or 
                                                      
62 Pitkowitz (n 2) 18. 
63 ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 97. Burford Capital, 2017 Annual Report (2017) 11 (“Until 2017, both Hong Kong and 
Singapore had prohibited litigation finance (except in insolvency), and indeed any form of risk-based litigation activity, 
including lawyers taking risk on their own fees. However, following significant education and lobbying by Burford, 
both jurisdictions passed legislation in 2017 that enabled litigation finance for arbitration.”) 
64 E.g. Pitkowitz (n 2) 3-23.  
65 One way these various objectives of legal claims (e.g., accountability, deterrence, compensation) can be advanced 
is to make it easier for complainants to pursue their cases. This can be done. for instance, through one-way fee-shifting. 
One-way fee shifting aims to “encourage[e] the maintenance of lawsuits by the beneficiaries of the fee shifting and at 
the same time both discourage[e] litigation and encourage[e] resolution of cases by the party who can only expect to 
pay fees, but not recover them. This effect motivates fee shifting provisions of the civil rights laws [in the United 
States] and other ‘private attorneys general’ statutes.” Spurlock v. Sullivan [1992] 783 F. Supp. 474, 480-481. 
66 Palm Springs Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hospital [1986] 628 F. Supp. 454, 462-64 (discussing, for example, 
statutory revisions designed to protect municipalities from paralysis that could be triggered due to potential liability 
for treble damages under antitrust law, and other approaches for ensuring accountability).  
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freedoms from nondiscrimination) when structuring rules on how broadly and actively to enable 
litigation. Additional considerations relate to different methods of encouraging suit, which can 
include relaxed standards of liability or burdens of proof, one-way or two-way fee-shifting rules, 
freedom to enter into contingency fee arrangements, liberal rules on subrogation, possibilities for 
damages claims and damage-multipliers, and third-party funding. 
 
Each of those methods for encouraging suit has particular costs and benefits. Notably, however, 
third-party funding of claims against the government has, in some cases, been identified as being 
especially problematic. In the US, for instance, the congress adopted a relevant law largely banning 
such purchase and pursuit of legal claims.67 This longstanding federal statute, the Anti-Assignment 
Act, 68  prohibits “a transfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States 
Government or of an interest in the claim,” as well as “authorization to receive payment for any 
part of the claim.”69 There are exceptions, including that claims can be transferred after they have 
been determined to be valid and the amount owed has been decided (e.g., a court has determined 
that the government owns the plantiff X amount), but the general rule remains in place.  
 
The Anti-Assignment aims to serve several policy objectives:  
 
first, to prevent persons of influence from buying up claims which might then be 
improperly urged upon Government officials; second, to prevent possible multiple 
payment of claims and avoid the necessity of the investigation of alleged assignments by 
permitting the Government to deal only with the original claimant; and third, to preserve 
for the Government defenses and counterclaims which might not be available against an 
assignee.70 
 
The Anti-Assignment Act applies broadly across various causes of action, including to prohibit 
voluntary assignments of indirect takings claims71 and tort claims.72  
 
This statute helps illustrates three key points. One is that even while governments may permit and 
even encourage suits against themselves in order to achieve certain policy objectives, they may 
nevertheless want to adopt rules governing the aims, interests and identities of potential claimants, 
and the identities of potential claimants, so as to avoid unintended and undesirable incentives to 
sue, and the problems that can arise when litigating against parties with whom the government had 
no direct dealing. Second, governments may want to expressly target third-party funding or other 
assignments of claims for regulation or bans due to the particular issues they raise.73 And third, 
                                                      
67 Third-party funding is, however, permitted in various contexts involving private litigation; and tools like fee shifting, 
contingency fee arrangements, and damage multipliers are available in certain contexts to encourage particular types 
of claims against the government. Thus, the restriction on assignment of claims against the government is treated 
differently than assignment generally, or other efforts to enable lawsuits against the government.  
68 31 USC § 3727.  
69 31 USC § 3727(a). 
70 Kingsbury v. United States [1977] 563 F.2d 1019, 1024. 
71 Bailey v. United States [2007] 78 Fed. Cl. 239, 267-68 (quoting United States v. Dow [1958] 357 U.S. 17, 20). 
72 See United States v. Shannon [1952] 342 U.S. 288, 289-90; Saint John Marine v. United States [1996] 92 F.3d 39, 
46.  
73 Thus, while assignment of claims is prohibited, contingency fee arrangements may be allowed. See, e.g., The United 
States Department of Justice, Justice Manual, Civil Resource Manual 223 (Costs Recoverable from the United States) 
<https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-223-costs-recoverable-united-states> accessed Mar. 20, 2019; 
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even if some governments have decided that third-party funding should not be permitted for claims 
against the government at the domestic level, no such restrictions yet apply specifically to third-
party funding in ISDS;74 this, in turn, means that the policy concerns behind such bans or other 
regulations, including concerns about motives for suit and undue influence of funders over the 
government, may not yet be adequately addressed in the context of ISDS. 
3.1.3 Investors’ decisions to remain engaged in the host-country or exit  
 
Investment treaties are often justified as being useful tools for advancing economic development 
due to their role in attracting and retaining foreign investment including, in particular, FDI. FDI, a 
specific subcategory of international investment, is generally defined representing a long-term 
investment, and one over which the foreign investor exercises significant control. The long-term 
nature of FDI and the element of control are key features of FDI that present potential advantages 
for host states in terms of commitments of capital and transfers of technology.  
 
Much analysis has been done to examine whether investment treaties actually attract FDI, with no 
clear or undisputed evidence that the presence of an investment treaty influences investors’ 
decisions regarding whether or not to invest in an FDI project in a particular host state.75 Yet much 
less work has been done on the important question whether investment treaties and, more 
specifically, access to the powerful ISDS mechanism and associated remedies, influence 
investment decisions regarding whether or not to remain engaged in the host country and relevant 
investment project when circumstances or relations begin to deteriorate.  
 
There are, however, reasons to suspect that ISDS and the possibility of expectation damages ISDS 
offers have a negative impact on investor retention and long-term investor-state relationships. 
While these issues arise even absent third-party funding, third-party funding may exacerbate 
concerns about these effects on investor-state relations. 
 
Research on the behavior of contracting parties have suggested that, particularly in cases involving 
long-term incomplete deals – such as the types of contracts that often are used for extractive 
industry and long-term infrastructure projects – the health and durability of the deal can be served 
by legal frameworks that set forth and use “low-powered” enforcement mechanisms to encourage 
and strengthen commitments to ongoing good faith engagement, information sharing and 
cooperation between the parties.76 These kinds of low-powered enforcement mechanisms focus on 
                                                      
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)); Mark R. Brown, ‘A Primer on 
the Law of Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988’ (2005) 37 (4) The Urban Lawyer 663, 665; Paul D. Reingold, ‘Requiem 
for Section 1983’ (2008) 3 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy 1, 1; Thomas A. Eaton & Michael 
Wells, ‘Attorney’s Fees, Nominal Damages, and Section 1983 Litigation’ (2016) 24 William & Mary Bill of Rights 
Journal 829. 
74 It is arguable, however, that if third-party funding of a claim against the government is not permitted under domestic 
law, that a third-party funding ISDS action against that government would be deemed inconsistent with public policy, 
providing an arguable ground for resisting enforcement under the New York Convention.  
75 See n 59.  
76 See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Charles F. Sabel and Robert E. Scott, ‘Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine’ (2010) 110 Colum. L.Rev. 1377, 1387-1402; Adam B. Badawi,  
‘Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from Franchising’ (2010) 7 J. Empirical Legal Studies 743; 
Erica L. Plambeck and Terry A. Taylor, ‘Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation 
and Capacity’ (2007) 53 Management Science 1859. 
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ensuring compliance with commitments to engage in relevant processes and in good faith. While 
damages may be awarded for breach, they are relatively limited in nature (to, e.g., reliance 
damages) as compared to “high-powered” sanctions for breach such as expectation damages. Such 
legal frameworks can help parties build the kind of relationship that allows their arrangement to 
survive over time and to help the parties to respond amicably to unforeseen circumstances.77  
 
In contrast, legal frameworks that offer high-powered legal enforcement mechanisms and remedies 
such as expectation damages can discourage parties from engaging in the informal exchanges and 
problem solving necessary to build trust and maintain relationships. High-powered legal 
enforcement can “function[] as a ‘first strike’ nuclear weapon, allowing the nonbreacher to capture 
all contract gains and imposing all losses on the breacher.” 78 Because a “single misstep can 
transform a surplus-generating cooperative enterprise into a zero sum game,”79 parties may not 
pursue (or be able to pursue without significant losses) otherwise desirable “actions - such as 
requests for mid-course adjustment of the contract - that invite a counterparty to reciprocate 
proportionally and informally….”80 Powerful dispute settlement mechanisms and remedies, in 
short, risk crowding out cooperation, to the detriment of the contract’s objectives and resilience.  
 
This research has implications for ISDS claims, and third-party funding of those claims. Even 
without third-party funders, the availability of the high-powered enforcement mechanism of ISDS, 
and the ability to secure expectation damages representing the present value of potentially decades 
of future lost profits, may encourage investor claimants to litigate in ISDS, to seek early payouts, 
and to exit the project, rather than to continue to engage with host countries and remain invested 
in the project, particularly when relationships or circumstances become difficult.81 The prospect 
of forward-looking expectation damages – damages arbitral tribunals are reportedly ever more 
comfortable awarding,82 and that are relatively less commonly available under domestic law83 – 
may, for instance, make it more attractive for investors in long-term infrastructure or extractives 
                                                      
77 Gilson et al. (n 76). 
78 Ibid 1401-1402. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See Alison E. Post, ‘Home Court Advantage: Investor Type and Contractual Resilience in the Argentina Water 
Sector’ (2014) 42 Politics & Society 107.  
82 Noah Rubins et al. (n 37) 200 (“[T]here has been a move away from backward-looking in favor of forward-looking 
(including market-based) methodologies reflecting increasing confidence among arbitrators that the rules of 
international law require full compensation based upon market indicators and that some degree of subjectivity and 
uncertainty, while inevitable, is not a bar to recovery…”) 
83 See, e.g., David Gaukrodger, ‘The Balance between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment 
Treaties: A Scoping Paper’ (2017) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2017/02, 20-21. The examples 
given in the sentence in the text of circumstances in which ISDS may make it more attractive for investors to sue 
governments relate to changes in the legal framework or decisions taken outside the contract. In other words, they 
relate to legislative, regulatory or administrative actions or inactions that are not breaches of the contract, but may 
adversely affect the investor’s recovery under the contract. Monetary damages, including expectation damages, for 
such legislative, regulatory or administrative actions are, as Gaukrodger notes, relatively rare under domestic law. 
Expectations damages, however, may be more likely to be available as a remedy for breach of contract. Nevertheless, 
as some have highlighted, there are policy questions about whether and when expectation damages against the 
government for breach of contract are in fact an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Julie Roin, ‘Public-Private Partnerships 
and Termination for Convenience Clauses: Time for a Mandate’ (2013) 63 Emory L.J. 282 (noting the risk that 
expectation damages will keep governments from seeking to adjust the terms of investor-state contracts for even good 
faith public interest reasons and suggesting contracts limit the availability of such remedies). 
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projects to adopt rigid positions protesting host state’s attempts to change relevant parts of the 
legal or regulatory framework, or to adopt decisions adverse to the project (such as decisions to 
decline requests for tariff raises for public services, change the fiscal regime, or to impose 
environmental or other penalties).84 If the project faces difficulties, the investor may prefer to 
exercise its “nuclear option,” exiting the deal and seeking future lost profits rather than accepting 
the changes or otherwise working towards a solution with the host-government.  
 
The hypothesis that third-party funders may magnify these issues is based on two related factors: 
One is that third-party funders are attracted by the prospect of being able to recover a share of the 
claimant’s (expectation) damages. This introduces into the investment relationship a new party 
with incentives for relatively near-term financial gains as opposed to revenues generated through 
longer-term engagement in the host country.85 A second factor is the likelihood, as discussed above, 
that the willingness and ability of third-party funders to fund these claims enables (more of) these 
claims to be brought. Indeed, the fact that third-party funders change investors’ cost-benefit 
calculations regarding whether or not to sue their host states is a key benefit that third-party funders 
and proponents of third-party funding highlight – it facilitates claims by those otherwise unwilling 
or unable to bring them. Thus, by reducing the costs and increasing incentives to sue, and involving 
a new (and potentially controlling) actor whose interests are in suing and recovering rather than 
staying and engaging, third-party funding may increase the strains ISDS places on complex long-
term deals, producing outcomes that seem to run counter to IIAs’ aims of promoting “sticky”, 
long-term investments benefitting the FDI investor as well as host states.86  
 
3.2 IMPACTS ON THE LAW AND OUTCOMES 
 
Much of the controversy around investment law, including whether it will result in host state 
liability for good faith public interest regulation of investment, arises not necessarily from the text 
                                                      
84 This discussion links to the theory of the obsolescing bargain, which hypothesizes that once an investor has sunk 
capital in the host state, the investor’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the state drops, and renders the investor vulnerable 
to the host state’s efforts to readjust the terms of the deal in the host state’s favor (or in the favor of particular 
government actors, entities). However, evidence seems to suggest that, at least in the context of long-term 
infrastructure deals, investors’ bargaining power remains strong. See, e.g., J. Luis Guasch, ‘Granting and 
Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it right’ (2004) World Bank, WBI Development Studies < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15024> accessed April 29, 2019; J. Luis Guasch and Stéphane 
Straub, ‘Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America’ (October 2005) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3749. Gausch’s research indicates that, rather than exploiting evolving power dynamics, government parties to public-
private partnerships relating to infrastructure investments may more commonly be the victims of power shifts, often 
having to respond to investors’ attempts to change the terms of the deal after it had been agreed. In one study of 
roughly 1000 concession contracts awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean between the mid-1980s and 2000, for 
instance, researchers found renegotiations occurred in 55% of transportation concessions, and 74% of water and 
sanitation contracts. Strikingly, 57% of the transportation concession renegotiations were initiated by the investor 
alone (27% by the government alone and 16% by both the government and the operator); even more jarring, 66% of 
the water and sanitation contract renegotiations were initiated by the operator (24% by the government and 10% by 
both the government and the operator). See also Lise Johnson, ‘The Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of 
Private Investment in Infrastructure’ (2014) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. 
RSCAS 2014/32. 
85 See, e.g., Rubins et al. (n 37) 200. 
86 In many cases the damages available under investment law exceed those available under domestic legal regimes, 
giving rise to a scenario in which ISDS can change the dynamics governing decisions regarding whether to stay and 
engage, or sue and leave. 
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of the treaties, but from how the treaties have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals. Thus, one set 
of issues to evaluate when considering the advantages and disadvantages of third-party funding is 
its effects on the types of claims that are brought, development of the law, and outcomes of 
settlements. This section examines those issues. 
3.2.1 Impacts on the quality of cases: frivolous and marginal cases 
 
Those arguing that third-party funding will lead to more frivolous claims contend that the 
particular risk-return models in the disputes and the willingness and ability of funders to fund risky 
disputes, particularly when they can diversify increased risk with a portfolio of investments,87 will 
drive an increase in frivolous claims. Funders, on the contrary, state that it would make no sense 
to invest in claims that are likely to fail. Both positions may be accurate. The key issue is how 
“frivolous” claims are defined; and in the context of ISDS, that is a word that has yet to be given 
much meaning. 
 
If a legal dispute involves application of a clear rule, such as a prohibition on driving over a certain 
speed, it will be relatively easy to identify whether a claim for speeding is or is not frivolous. But 
the more one moves away from a system governed by clear rules, to one governed by imprecise 
standards, the more difficult it will become to determine whether any claim or argument is indeed 
frivolous. On the rule-to-standard spectrum, the infamously broad and nebulous language in 
treaties mean that investment law is far along the “standard” side. 88  What is fair? What is 
equitable? What is arbitrary? What is an indirect expropriation or, for that matter, a reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation? In light of the malleable and subjective nature of many of these 
terms and concepts, many positions are arguable and few facially without merit.  
 
In addition to the challenges of identifying a frivolous claim that are raised by the standard-based 
nature of investment treaties, several structural forces in a system of ad hoc ISDS make it even 
less likely that frivolous claims are identified as such. One is that arbitrators are relatively 
independent of the states that are party to the underlying investment treaty, and may therefore 
consider themselves relatively free to depart from treaty parties’ guidance and adopt their own 
interpretations of the underlying treaty language.89 This therefore can create a gap in practice 
between what states say the treaties mean and what tribunals interpret them to mean. Claimants 
can exploit that gap to pursue claims that appear frivolous to state treaty parties but may not be 
labeled as such by tribunals.  
 
                                                      
87 See, e.g. ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 38 (“Structuring finance around multiple claims under either model usually 
involves some form of cross-collateralization, meaning that the funder’s return is dependent upon the overall net 
financial performance of the portfolio as opposed to the outcome of each particular claim.”); Burford, Beyond 
Litigation Finance (2016); IMF Bentham (n 30).  
88 Even modern treaties, which attempt to more carefully define what treaty obligations mean, still rely on vague 
standards as opposed to clear rules. The CETA, for example, attempts to clarify the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard by saying that it prohibits “manifestly arbitrary” conduct (among other standards), which still retains the 
nature of a vague standard. CETA (n 2) Art. 8.10(2). On the subjective nature of “arbitrariness”, see, e.g., Thomas J. 
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, ‘The Real World of Arbitrariness’ (2008) 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 
89 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 Cal. L. Rev. 
1. (“Tribunals composed of independent members have a weaker incentive to serve those states' interests and are more 
likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives, or the interests of other states to influence their judgments.” Ibid 
27). 
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A second structural issue is that arbitrators, who are paid per case/hour rather than based on a set 
salary, may be incentivized to not close doors to certain claims or arguments, and instead give the 
impression that almost every claim is a colorable, non-frivolous one. In Apotex v. United States,90 
for instance, the United States had argued to the tribunal that the NAFTA’s most-favored nation 
provision did not permit the investor to import a more favorable FET obligation from the US-
Jamaica BIT. The United States also highlighted that the other NAFTA parties shared that 
interpretation.91 But:  
 
[r]ather than evaluate the NAFTA parties’ positions or the legal significance of agreement 
among the three states on the issue, the tribunal proceeded to evaluate the claimants’ claims 
under the US-Jamaica BIT as if the most-favored nation provision could in fact be used to 
import more favorable standards of protection. “[W]hether the NAFTA Parties [were] 
correct” in their interpretation that the most-favored nation provision could not play such 
a role would, according to the tribunal, “have to await the decision of another NAFTA 
tribunal.”92   
 
The tribunal thus sent a signal to future claimants that they should feel free to test the same theory. 
And as others have commented, it is not uncommon for tribunals to provide these subtle messages 
of encouragement to future claimants.93   
 
A third structural feature of ISDS that makes it difficult to label any claim frivolous is the fact that 
there is no system of precedent or appeal, meaning that even if the tribunal does reject an argument 
or case as failing or frivolous, that decision will not bar future attempts by claimants to raise the 
same legal argument. 
 
Due, therefore, to the elusive nature of and apparently high bar applied to “frivolous” claims in 
investment law, it is useful to move beyond that label. Instead, the inquiry should be on whether 
third-party funding encourages marginal claims – claims that advance arguments about investment 
law that seek to stretch its reach in unintended and potentially undesirable directions.  
 
But what, exactly, is meant in context when we refer to marginal claims? When governments 
explain the value of and need for investment treaties, they commonly do so using the relatively 
easy cases – the example of the investor that sunk costs in a long-term project in the host country 
                                                      
90 Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)12/1 (Aug. 25, 2014). 
91 Apotex v. United States, US Counter-Memorial and Objections to Jurisdiction, Dec. 14, 2012, paras 385-390. 
92 Lise Johnson, ‘New Weaknesses: Despite a major win, arbitration decisions in 2014 increased the US’s exposure 
to litigation and liability’ (CCSI 2015) 8-9 (quoting Apotex v. United States, para 9.71). 
93 See, e.g., Robert Howse, ‘Eli Lily v. Canada: A Pyrrhic Victory Against Big Pharma’ (March 26, 2017) International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog <https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/03/eli-lilly-v-canada-a-pyrrhic-
victory-against-big-pharma-.html> accessed April 29, 2019. Additionally, in dispute after dispute under the NAFTA, 
NAFTA parties have made submissions to the tribunal presenting their views of the NAFTA’s FET provision and the 
relevance of the investor’s legitimate expectations. Despite the briefing and the opportunity presented to tribunals to 
issue prospective claimants a clear statement about the law, tribunals often decline to decide the issue, enabling and 
potentially encouraging future claimants to try again. Every time a future claimant tries the same arguments, of course, 
a state incurs costs as it raises the same defenses. See Patrick Dumberry, ‘The Emergence of a Consistent Case Law: 
How NAFTA Tribunals have Interpreted the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ (Oct. 30, 2013) Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog < http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2013/10/30/the-emergence-of-a-consistent-case-law-
how-nafta-tribunals-have-interpreted-the-fair-and-equitable-treatment-standard/> accessed April 29, 2019. 
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and, once there, was expropriated and appropriated without compensation by opportunistic 
domestic officials and left without a remedy by corrupt, biased or inept courts. They do not talk 
about the marginal cases. These are the cases in which, for example, a company sues after it is 
assessed higher taxes on windfall profits or charges for tax evasion;94 they are the cases in which 
the government in good faith imposed a ban or moratoria on extractive industry projects, or denied 
certain permits, based on public concerns that the environmental and social costs resulting from 
the project would outweigh the potential fiscal and economic benefits;95 and they are the cases 
where a government opts to stop giving investors tax incentives that drain public budgets and make 
little economic and policy sense. 96  Many of these kinds of claims involve highly complex 
questions of public policies, preferences and competing rights and obligations, and are not cases 
in which the government was acting in bad faith or for discriminatory purposes to exploit foreign 
investors.  
 
As Krzysztof Pelc recently found, it may be these marginal claims that are increasingly constituting 
the bulk of investment disputes.97  By “distinguish[ing] the 1,812 individual legal claims brought 
across 742 investment disputes, from 1993 to the present day”:98  
 
[T]he investment regime has shifted in its primary purpose since its origins. Most disputes 
today are not over “sovereign theft” or direct takings, but over indirect expropriation. And 
most respondent countries are not rent-seeking regimes with low rule of law, but stable 
democracies with independent judiciaries. To put it in stark terms, the greatest portion of 
legal challenges in the investment regime today seeks monetary compensation for 
regulatory measures implemented by democracies.99 
 
                                                      
94 E.g. Damien Charlotin, ‘ICC Tribunal Finds in Favour of Energy Consortium in Billion Dollar Tax Dispute with 
Philippines’ IAReporter (April 25, 2019) (award not public) (describing that a consortium of Chevron and Shell and 
a government-owned firm have prevailed in an investment dispute challenging a government tax monitoring agency 
(the Commission of Audit) determination that the consortium had underpaid billions in income taxes to the state). The 
consortium tried to use provisional measures to enjoin legal related proceedings before the Philippines Supreme Court. 
Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Foreign Investor Asks Arbitrators to Enjoin Philippines Supreme Court Proceedings’ IAReporter 
(Sept. 3, 2018). 
95 E.g. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (Oct. 14, 2016); Lone 
Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2; Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/16/41; Galway Gold Inc. v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/13; Red Eagle 
Exploration Limited v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/12; Cosigo Resources, Ltd., Cosigo 
Resources Sucursal Colombia, Tobie Mining and Energy, Inc. v. Republic of Colombia (not public); Infinito Gold v. 
Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5); Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction 
and Liability, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (March 17, 2015) and Award on Damages (Jan. 10, 2019); TransCanada 
Corporation and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. The United States of America, Order of the Secretary-General 
Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21 (March 24, 2017). 
96 E.g. Spain faces nearly 40 investment claims arising out of, among related claims, changes made to incentives in its 
renewable energy sector. See e.g. S. Ripinsky, Damages Assessment in the Spanish Renewable Energy Arbitrations: 
First Awards and Alternative Compensation Approach Proposal (Nov. 29, 2018) Transnational Dispute Management. 
Romania also faces a claim arising out of changes to incentives schemes in its renewable energy sector. LSG Building 
Solutions and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/19. 
97 Krzysztof J. Pelc, ‘What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?’ (2017) 71 Int’l Org. 559. 
98 Ibid 560. 
99 Ibid. 
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These patterns may be independent of and unaffected by third-party funding; but third-party 
funding could be driving or magnifying these trends.  
 
Analysis of the impact of third-party funding in the domestic context highlights what would be 
important to know in the ISDS context. Theoretical and empirical research done by David Abrams 
and Daniel Chen has concluded third-party funders have tended to take cases raising relatively 
novel issues. Looking at a sample of cases that a funder chose to fund and those the funder 
reviewed but ultimately chose not to support, the research finds that those selected for investment 
by the funder involved riskier claims that may have “otherwise failed due to legal uncertainty.”100 
Abrams and Chen also compared third-party funders contingency fee lawyers, reasoning that as 
between the two, the third-party funders would be more likely to “work on cases that have a low 
chance of success.”101 As discussed in the next subsection, these findings support a position that 
third-party funding seems to be playing a role in pushing the boundaries of the law.102  
 
“Frivolous” claims and different implications for claimants and states 
 
While it may be undesirable for tribunals (and the precedent-less ISDS system) to leave doors 
quite open to claimants to raise and re-raise the same unsuccessful arguments, different 
considerations may arise with respect to states. Given the role of states as masters of their treaties, 
there may be good reasons for allowing them to continue to raise points notwithstanding their 
rejection by previous tribunals. For example, Argentina has stated repeatedly when defending 
cases involving minority, non-controlling shareholders that its treaties do not give this type of 
claimant the ability to seek relief for harms suffered by the company in which it held shares.103 
While Argentina has routinely lost on this point, it has continued to make the case, asserting its 
view of the treaty to which it is a party and attempting to reassert its primacy in treaty interpretation 
and application. This practice by Argentina and other states is one way they can help ensure that 
treaties are interpreted consistently and in accordance with their object and purpose, and can also 
represent state practice that helps create and shape customary international law. If there were a 
system of precedent, or stronger signals by tribunals (e.g., through cost-awards) that arguments 
that had failed in the past were frivolous and should not be raised again, it may become more 
difficult for states to play these roles molding international law. 
 
However desirable and important it may be for states to raise and re-raise defenses, doing so is 
costly. Defending ISDS arbitration has a high price tag – roughly US$ 5 million by some 
                                                      
100 Chen (n 50) 33; Abrams & Chen (n 50) 1077. 
101 Abrams & Chen (n 50) 179. 
102 Chen (n 50) 23. 
103 See, e.g., Urbaser v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26 (December 19, 2012) 43, 
204-54 (noting that Argentina had argued that shareholders can only bring claims for harms to rights/losses suffered 
as shareholders, and rejecting those arguments); Azurix v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12 (September 1, 2009) 85-130 (setting forth Argentina’s arguments, the tribunal’s rejection of them, and the 
annulment committee’s decision to uphold the tribunal’s decisions); BG Group v. Argentina, Final Award, 
UNCITRAL (December 24, 2007) 114 (noting that Argentina had raised the argument that shareholders could only 
bring claim for interference with their corporate rights, not “derivative” claims). For more information on public policy 
issues related to shareholder claims see David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims for 
Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law’ (2014) OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment 2014/02. 
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estimates 104  – meaning that states may feel reluctant to spend time and money developing 
arguments with a losing track record, despite the broader implications of them not doing so. Even 
if a state’s legal fees are shifted to an unsuccessful claimant, states frequently encounter difficulties 
collecting these awards.105  
 
These considerations are different for an investor-claimant. As for a state, it takes monetary 
resources for an investor to raise losing arguments. But for investors, and unlike for respondent 
states, success on a previously unsuccessful argument can result in an actual win, a financial upside. 
The cost-benefit analysis of raising a wide range of claims, even if one or two are dismissed, may 
be worth the additional expense. And, with third-party funding, that calculation shifts even further 
as the financial downsides to the claimant are mitigated or eliminated. 106  While states may 
ultimately be forced by practical, financial considerations to give up on pressing points and 
positions in treaty interpretation that have previously failed, investors and funders, who are able 
to shift and spread risks, may be motivated by the potential upside to continue to advance 
arguments that had been rejected in the past. 
3.2.2 Impacts on the substantive development of investment law 
 
In Abrams and Chen’s studies of third-party funding Australia, not only did they find that it led to 
the filing of more cases generally, and more novel and uncertain cases in particular, but that 
decisions in third-party funded cases were particularly influential in developing the law, being 
reversed less and cited more than non-funded cases.107 The funded cases were therefore able to 
shape the ongoing development of the law to a greater extent than non-funded cases. 
 
It is essential to ask whether the same thing is happening in investment treaty law. Are third-party 
funders having an impact on the substantive contours of the law by pursuing, and succeeding on, 
novel and marginal claims? If so, what are the implications for the content of that law and state 
obligations and liability under it?  
 
Some research indicates that the involvement of a funder in ISDS cases will indeed make it more 
likely that claimants secure favorable decisions from tribunals. A 2014 study found that  claimants 
prevailed in ISDS cases in which they had spent between 1.75 and 2 times more than the 
                                                      
104 Behn & Daza (n 17). 
105 E.g. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Frustrated by inability to collect on costs orders against foreign investors, Vietnam pushes 
for stricter ‘security for costs’ provisions in investment treaties’, IAReporter (Oct. 27, 2018); Jarrod Hepburn, 
‘Analysis: Australia and Indonesia sign new FTA, including investment provisions on security for costs, third-party 
funding, dual citizens, and public health claims’, IAReporter (March 5, 2019). See also Memorandum from Iván Zarak 
A., Acting Minister of Economy and Finance, Republic of Panama to Meg Kinnear, Secretary General, International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, dated September 12, 2016 (stating that anonymous responses to a survey 
indicate that, among 35 respondent states that had been granted costs awards during the period under review, seventeen 
awards (49%) had been paid in full, five awards (14%) had been paid in part, and thirteen awards (37%) had not been 
paid at all….among the twenty-two costs awards in favor of respondent states that had been paid either in full or in 
part, fourteen awards were paid voluntarily (64%), two awards were paid pursuant to a settlement (9%), and six awards 
were paid through enforcement (27%)). 
106 Particularly as any sanction or downfall resulting from raising a “frivolous” claim is unlikely. 
107 Chen (n 50) 42, 49; Abrams & Chen (n 50) 1105-06. 
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respondent.108 More recently, in a study of all known disputes filed between 1987 and 2015, Karen 
Remmer found that the availability of financial resources and access to sophisticated knowledge 
and information about the investment dispute process – each of which funders can contribute 
directly and through retention of top tier law firms – were important determinants of ISDS 
outcomes.109 Remmer concluded investors that are represented by the top tier international law 
firms with significant expertise in ISDS cases are more likely to win than those that are not funded 
by such firms; she similarly found that roughly 61% of those investors prevailed in the case or 
obtained a settlement.110 Whether or not respondent states had retained top tier law firms, however, 
did not have similarly strong impacts on outcomes.111 Compounding the uneven effects of access 
to funding and expertise, and as noted above, the near complete asymmetry in ISDS, means that 
access to funding and the knowledge, expertise, and access it can buy is not available to respondent 
states, at least not on anything resembling a scalable level. While defense-side funding is 
challenging in any legal system, it is all but precluded for respondent states in ISDS cases, likely 
making it even more difficult than it would be for investors to secure the legal and other expertise 
seemingly key to securing positive outcomes.  
 
In addition to shifting outcomes in particular cases, third-party funding – and the increased chances 
of success it appears to bring (especially to investors) – can also shift outcomes in the law more 
systemically. Third-party funders depend on their ability to navigate investment law and ISDS. It 
is not a small step to conclude that their interest would also include shaping relevant norms in their 
favor, if and to the extent possible.112 Marc Galanter has described the advantages and objectives 
that repeat players, such as funders, have in legal systems, including: (1) opportunities to develop 
expertise and have ready access to specialists, (2) opportunities to develop facilitative informal 
relations with institutional incumbents, (3) the ability to adopt strategies calculated to maximize 
gain over a series of cases, even where this involves the risk of maximum loss in some cases 
(whereas parties only involved with a single case must always minimize the probability of 
maximum loss), (4) invest resources in shaping relevant rules over the long term, including by 
                                                      
108 Tim Hart, ‘Study of Damages in International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Cases’(2014) 3 
Transnational Dispute Management 11, 29 (“In cases where claimants won, we had party costs for both parties in 
eleven of those cases. In all eleven of those cases, the claimant spent more than the respondent. In this group of cases, 
the claimants spent 1.75 times the amount the respondents spent. If CSOB v. Slovak Republic is excluded, claimants 
outspent respondents by more than 2:1….We do note however, that there is a bias in the underlying data as costs are 
generally reported most often in the awards in instances where the tribunal awarded costs and therefore cases with 
disproportionate costs spent by the winning party are more likely to be reported.”) 
109 Karen Remmer, ‘The Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Reassessment’, in Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2015-16 (Johnson & Sachs eds) (Oxford University Press 2018). 
110 Ibid 164-65 (“The data on legal resources reveal that both states and investors do so slightly more often than states. 
One of the world’s top thirty-eight international law firms represents investors in 46 percent of ISDS cases, whereas 
states draw on the expertise of top firms in 38 percent of cases…. The odds of a state prevailing in a dispute are 1.7 
times higher if investors are not represented by a top firm. When investors engage prominent international law firms, 
60.9 per cent of disputes conclude with either an investor win or settlement. Possibly by raising the perceived odds of 
investor victory, a prominent legal team may strengthen the incentives for states to reach compromises with claimants. 
No comparable evidence emerges for respondent states.”) 
111 Ibid. 
112 Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding (2011) 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1314 
(setting out why going to trial rather than settling may be in the strategic interest of funders: (1) generation and 
development of skills and subject-matter expertise, (2) reputation building (particularly for new funders), and (3) 
strategic rule-making and litigation until favorable decisions are obtained, while will favor parties with an ongoing 
interest.) 
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such methods as lobbying (and because of the resources and expertise held by these kind of repeat 
players, they may be able lobby effectively), and (5) in some cases, be less concerned with the 
financial outcome in favor of an outcome that will favorably influence the outcome of future 
cases.113  
 
In other words, the strategic funding of cases that push the boundaries and direction of investment 
law in ways that favor funders’ interests is an expected and rational decision on the part of 
funders.114 For example, a funder recently dissatisfied with the tribunal’s interpretation of an 
“implicit legality requirement” now seeks to overturn the denial of jurisdiction in the case.115 The 
annulment proceeding will come at a cost but will not, by itself, generate any financial recovery 
for the funder; nevertheless, it can be crucial for future success in that and other disputes that might 
otherwise close the door to claimants’ claims on “illegality” grounds.116 While the funder’s attempt 
to overturn this particular decision may be entirely motivated by its interest in the case at hand, it 
also seems quite reasonable to infer that this kind of “precedent” is unfavorable to a funder’s long-
term interest dependent on broader investor protections, which may also be a motivating factor in 
this context. While there is no de facto precedent, some arbitrators have expressed a sense of duty 
to seek to align their decisions with ones that had been issued in previous decisions;117 additionally, 
there are some cases, including annulment decisions, that appear to have been especially impactful 
on the development of the law.118  
 
                                                      
113 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law 
& Soc’y Rev. 95, 98-100.  
114 For example, in the case of Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. et al. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration No. 
24/2007, the funder, Group Menatep Limited, was a former majority shareholder in the Russian oil company, Yukos 
(not a commercial third-party funder) and there was no formal, written funding agreement. There was speculation that 
Menatep was funding the case in an effort to create favorable “precedent” that would be helpful in its future, much 
larger, shareholder dispute against Russia. Victoria Shannon Sahani, ‘Revealing Not-for-Profit Third-Party Funders 
in Investment Arbitration’ (March 1, 2017) Investment Claims. IMF Bentham states that “We will take the long-term 
view over the short-term, every time. This means preferring to maximize the value of our future cashflow over an 
immediate uplift in profitability.” IMF Bentham (n 37) 4. 
115  See Damien Charlotin, ‘Funder-Backed Investors Seek to Overturn Tribunal’s “Black Swan” Finding that 
Investment Treaties Contain Implicit Legality Requirement; Two Tribunals Independently Reached Such a View Last 
Year,’ IAReporter (March 20, 2019); Cortec Mining Kenya v. Kenya, Application for Annulment, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/29 (February 15, 2019). 
116 A separate tribunal had made a similar finding on the significance of “illegality” less than two weeks earlier. Ibid.  
117 See, e.g., Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 (December 14, 
2012) para 187 ( “[T]he Tribunal believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions 
established in a series of consistent cases. It further believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the 
circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law, 
and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards the certainty of the 
rule of law”). But see, e.g., Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 (November 15, 2015) 
para 224 (“This Tribunal is required to decide the arguments advanced by the Parties in this arbitration based on the 
evidence adduced by the Parties in these proceedings. It cannot be influenced therefore by the result of a different 
arbitration, where an investor’s claim appears to have been formulated differently and decided on different arguments 
and evidence”).   
118 See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquia SA and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (August 23, 2002) (holding that the tribunal had exceeded its authority by failing to take 
the claim due to a local litigation provision in the underlying concession). 
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Moreover, portfolio funding permits risk diversification through the bundling of a long-shot case 
with favorable potential for rule change into a larger bundle of claims.119 In cases in which funders 
are granted the ability to influence or control decisions to settle claims or see them through 
arbitration, funders can ensure that such cases proceed through an award on the merits rather than 
settling. Because funders have no ethical obligations to the funded party, only to their shareholders, 
there are no ethical or regulatory hurdles to managing a claim in this way.120  
 
In this context it is also important to recall that state parties to IIAs attempted to define the 
circumstances under which aggrieved individuals and entities may bring and succeed on claims 
against them in an international forum.  While states have delegated to arbitral tribunals the role of 
interpreting and applying the substantive standards that govern their behavior to the specific factual 
circumstances at hand, it is the state party (and its treaty counterparty), who have granted the 
claimant a treaty-based and agreed right to arbitrate within the framework of protections granted, 
not beyond. 121  Expansion of these protections in funder- (and claimant-) friendly ways thus 
threatens to distort the treaties, and cause their interpretation to move in directions that place undue 
restraints on government conduct.  
3.2.3 Impacts on decisions to settle claims 
 
While in some cases, such as when a funder is interested in influencing the development of the 
law, a funder may have an interest in seeing the claim through to an award.122 In other cases, a 
financial settlement may be a more attractive option. It is also possible that funders would seek for 
claimants to settle claims for reasons completely unrelated to the claim itself, such as the funder 
seeking to realize (or not) a profit during a particular time period, or to balance the overall risk (i.e. 
cases settling versus those continuing through the award phase) of a funder’s investment portfolio. 
 
A significant percentage of ISDS claims are reportedly settled between the parties prior to an award 
being issued. 123  Given the lack of transparency around settlement generally, and third-party 
funding in particular, it is difficult to estimate how many funded cases settle (and whether they 
settle at different rates than non-funded cases). While settlements can be seen as positive outcomes, 
saving parties the time and expense of arbitration, in the context of ISDS, settlements also raise 
numerous public policy issues that cannot be ignored, including threats to principles of good 
governance (including government accountability), respect for the rule of law, transparency, and 
respect for citizens’ rights and interests under domestic law and international human rights 
                                                      
119 Burford Capital describes portfolio financing as “inherently flexible and ideally suited for defensive matters as well 
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is diversified.” Burford, Beyond Litigation Finance (2016). 
120 Steinitz (n 112) 1319. 
121 See e.g. Anthea Roberts, ‘Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights’ (2015) 56 
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122 Steinitz (n 112) 1271. 
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that are negotiated prior to the filing of an ISDS claim, and does not reflect undisclosed settlements that result in the 
claimant officially withdrawing or failing to continue to pursue a claim. 
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norms.124 With third-party funding, additional considerations arise. These include whether funders 
will impact settlement between the investor claimant and the government. A funder with control 
over settlement decisions could, for instance, prevent settlements for non-financial remedies that, 
even if designed to enable the relevant investment project to continue or restart, would not generate 
a monetary return for the funder. Additionally, the funder could prevent settlements under a certain 
amount. 
 
Of course, every case is different and every funder is different, so, for instance, while some funders 
may never intervene with a funded party to promote a settlement,125 others may depend on cases 
settling for financial or easily monetized agreements. As one funder explained, 
 
part of the secret of litigation investing is having a large, diversified portfolio so 
that we always have some cases going to trial, with the potential of high returns but 
the presence of binary risk of complete loss, while benefiting from the tendency of 
matters to settle and produce desirable returns from the majority of the portfolio 
without litigation risk.126 
 
Another funder states that its investment managers “must be adept negotiators, because they are 
frequently required to negotiate… conditions of settlement and more.”127  
 
Empirical work has considered whether third-party funding increases or decreases rates of 
settlement. For example, Chen’s work in Australia finds that the introduction of third-party funding 
appears to increase settled outcomes.128  
 
It would be important to understand these impacts in the context of ISDS. It may be, for example, 
that even if the funder does not have direct influence or control over decisions to settle, the 
asymmetric introduction of the third-party funder into a claim on the side of the claimant will shift 
bargaining power further in favor of the funded claimant and away from a respondent state with 
consequent impacts on willingness to settle and on settlement outcomes.  
 
In terms of impacts on settlement outcomes, some analysis of third-party funding suggests that 
funders can help to achieve socially efficient dispute outcomes by facilitating a greater alignment 
of risk tolerance between the disputing parties. As Jonathan Molot explains when discussing third-
party funding generally (i.e. not in the specific context of third-party funding in ISDS),129 disputing 
                                                      
124 See Johnson & Guven (n 40) (discussing public policy concerns surrounding the settlement of investment disputes 
and raising questions to consider in the context of reform of ISDS). While domestic legal systems often include 
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126 Burford, 2017 Annual Report (n 63) 4. 
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include ISDS claims). 
128 Chen (n 50) 49; Abrams & Chen (n 50). 
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parties settle to save the expenses of going to trial and to eliminate the risk of a worse-than-
expected trial outcome.130 To the extent two parties have roughly equal bargaining power, stand 
to gain equally from settling, and are well-educated on the merits and see eye-to-eye on the range 
of possible award outcomes, one would expect them to gravitate towards the expected merits-
based value of a suit in their settlement agreement, which may be preferable to a subsequent and 
potentially costly, lengthy, and misguided adjudicatory decision.131  
 
Where, however, the parties have different risk tolerances, this imbalance in risk 
preferences may lead to an imbalance in bargaining power and to a settlement that 
departs dramatically from the mean expected jury award. A one-time, risk-averse 
party will be more fearful of the worst-case scenario than a repeat player because 
the risk-averse party cannot absorb and redistribute the costs imposed by an adverse 
ruling, unlike the repeat player who holds a diverse pool of litigation risk. For this 
reason, a one-time defendant worried about a catastrophic loss may agree to pay 
more than the mean expected damages award to eliminate that risk. Conversely, a 
one-time plaintiff worried about recovering nothing at all may agree to accept less. 
Where a lawsuit pits a one-time, risk-averse party against a repeat-player, risk-
neutral party, the imbalance may skew settlements significantly. The weaker party 
in these lawsuits may be willing to settle for an amount that departs dramatically 
from the mean damages award in order to eliminate the risk of a worst-case loss.132 
 
Funders, which are “repeat players” in the legal market, can help level these asymmetries. They 
are knowledgeable, well-resourced, and are able to view each case from a risk-neutral perspective. 
When a weak party (or one-shotter) that is adverse to a stronger party (or repeat player) aligns with 
a funder, the alignment of that funder with the weaker party may help balance bargaining dynamics 
between the parties to the dispute and better ensure that settlement outcomes align with objective 
merits of the claim.133  
 
But these dynamics – where the funder backs the weaker party or the one-shotter and helps level 
an otherwise unlevel playing fields in litigation against relatively strong adversaries or repeat 
players – do not seem to characterize typical ISDS cases where investors are frequently bargaining 
from positions of relative strength. Instead of reducing power asymmetries, the role of third-party 
funding in ISDS may instead serve to exacerbate them, increasing investors’ bargaining strength 
relative to that of respondent states. 
 
There are several reasons why investors may have greater strength and bargaining power through 
ISDS than states, power which stands to be strengthened even more by third-party funding. For 
one, most respondent states involved in ISDS proceedings are not repeat players engaged in a large 
number of ISDS claims. One study found that 60% of respondents have faced 5 or fewer claims.134 
While some respondents have faced numerous cases, those cases may appear over a long period 
                                                      
130 Jonathan Molot, ‘Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem’ (2010) 99 Geo. L. J. 65, 84. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Steinitz (n 112) 1271. 
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had faced 6-9 claims, and 29 had faced 10 or more claims.  
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of time, minimizing institutional learning that may occur. Additionally, the vast majority of ISDS 
respondents are revenue-constrained low-, lower-middle or upper-middle income counties.135  
 
In contrast, a very high percentage of ISDS claimants are large and well-resourced multinational 
enterprises.136 One study found that the beneficiaries of ISDS-ordered financial transfers in favor 
of the claimant have “overwhelmingly been companies with more than US$1 billion in annual 
revenue – especially extra-large companies with more than US$10 billion – and individuals who 
have over US$100 million in net wealth.”137 In some cases, the annual revenue of a claimant 
dwarfs that of the respondent government.138 While claimants, like many respondents, tend to also 
have low levels of overall “repeat play”, third-party funders, who can enable (and may require) the 
hiring of repeat-player, top-tier law firms and experts, and who also may exercise at least some 
control over the management of the claim, feature in recurring claimant-side positions.  
 
Respondent states also face risks investors do not, which can further affect their willingness and 
ability to defend cases, and decisions regarding whether and on what terms to settle. States, which 
are on the receiving end of ISDS claims, are uniquely exposed to potential damage awards and 
reputational harms. While it is true that investor claimants may also face risks when bringing 
claims, namely risks of not recovering losses suffered (particularly in a context that lacks 
counterclaims), it is important to highlight that an investor’s assessment of its risk of loss is not 
necessarily limited to its assessment of its ISDS case. This is because ISDS claims are not investors’ 
only means of recourse. Rather, such claims may be pursued alongside potential recovery or relief 
pursuant to political risk insurance coverage, domestic law claims against the government, 
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diplomatic pressure,139 or contract-based claims. Thus, the basic one-way structure of ISDS claims, 
and the relationship of ISDS with other fora, mean that the ISDS mechanism systemically exposes 
respondent states to greater risks of loss than investor claimants. Third-party funding, by enabling 
claimants to avoid or reduce the cost and risk of litigation, exacerbates this asymmetry. 
 
Risk-tolerance of respondents is also reduced relative to that of investors by the fact that 
investment law is a standard- rather than rule-based legal system.140 Rules – e.g., prohibitions on 
driving over a certain speed - are precise and it is fairly easy to determine when such a rule has 
been violated. The more a legal system moves away from one governed by clear rules to one 
governed by imprecise standards, the more costs of compliance grow.141 In standards-based legal 
systems the costs of compliance are largely born by those who seek to conform their behavior to 
standard-based law.142 In situations where states are unclear of how law will be applied to fact, 
they may be willing to settle for an amount that may depart from an objectively anticipated 
damages award in order to eliminate the risk of a worst-case scenario.143  
 
Overall, and in contrast to how it may work in other contexts, the injection of a third-party funder 
into a claim on the side of the ISDS claimant does not seem to level the playing field, or create 
efficiencies in settlement outcomes. Rather, investor access to third-party funding, and the deep 
experience, expertise, insider information and resources that are provided by funders, may instead 
exacerbate the unbalanced power dynamics that already exist between many investors and states 
which see investors approaching claims from positions of relative power advantage.144 In light of 
these factors, state may rationally decide to settle rather than contest a claim even when the claim 
is based on questionable legal grounds or when the state has a strong defense. 145 Third-party 
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Canada while bringing the case under the BIT between Bolivia and the United Kingdom); ADC Affiliate v. Hungary, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (October 2, 2006) paras 361-62 (noting that the claimants’ shareholders had 
sought help from the Canadian government while the claimants pursued relief under the Cyprus-Hungary BIT). 
140 Shyamkrishna Balganesh sets forth these arguments in the context of copyright law and the use of third-party 
funding in that context. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Essay: Copyright Infringement Markets’ (2013) 113 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2277. 
141 While standards-based systems can become more rule-like when ex-post contextualization can help to inform 
expectations and shape behavior, ISDS does not have the elements required to permit this contextualization to occur. 
In ISDS, vague legal standards are interpreted and applied by ad hoc arbitrators who are not bound by precedent and 
whose decisions are not subject to appeal. 
142 Balganesh (n 140) 2296 (These costs typically manifest by requiring increased time and effort to understand the 
law and the behavior that it condones, or alternatively, condemns; by hiring or training legal advisors who can 
understand and advise (in)action necessary for compliance; and/or through a comprehensive system of adjudication 
that can contextualize and fill in the practical content of standards ex-post.) 
143 See e.g. Molot (n 130) 84. 
144 While not the subject of this paper, in cases where claimants had a choice to bring a claim based on the same 
alleged wrong in a different forum, the claimant has presumably assessed its options and preferred ISDS over that 
forum. See e.g. Johnson, Sachs & Sachs (n 53). 
145 Notably, settlement offers need not be monetary, but could be in the form of the state relaxing the regulatory 
environment in favor of the investor’s interests (which may not be in the interest of society at large). E.g. Dow 
AgroSciences v. Canada (n 26) (describing how the Canadian province of Quebec settled a claim brought by a US 
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funding can thus shift evolving power dynamics and settlement outcomes in favor of an investor 
and away from the state in cases where such dynamics may already be significantly skewed.  
 
3.3 IMPACTS ON RESPONDENT STATES AND THEIR GOVERNANCE OF INVESTMENT 
3.3.1 Impacts on state conduct: regulatory chill and overdeterrence  
 
Governments, in order to fulfill their range of responsibilities to a wide variety of individuals and 
groups, need policy space and authority to enact, implement, revise, refine, and enforce their laws, 
policies, and practices in order to achieve public interest objectives and to react to changing 
circumstances, evidence, needs, and priorities.146 This policy space can be of particular importance 
for governments whose legal frameworks are still evolving and developing to reflect best 
international practice. Of course, policy space is not, and should not be, unlimited. It is constrained 
by, for instance, contract, domestic constitutional and administrative law, and by customary and 
treaty law on a range of issues including human rights. Thus, investment treaties are far from 
unique in constraining government powers and are not here criticized on those grounds per se. 
What is important is to understand the nature of constraints placed on states by investment treaties, 
how and why they go beyond those imposed through other sources of law, and the extent to which 
they may overdeter, by unduly discouraging (or requiring compensation for) good faith actions 
taken by governments in the public interest to achieve economic, social and environmental aims.147  
 
The availability of third-party funding in ISDS has the effect of facilitating and encouraging suits 
against governments because a profit seeking industry is able to generate returns by taking a 
financial interest in the outcome of claims and has incentive to ensure qualifying ISDS cases are 
brought (and that the law is developed in the funding industry’s favor) . Controversially, in many 
cases third-party funders may be profiting from the financing of claims against governments that 
have engaged in good faith conduct taken in the public interest. It is unclear that, in light of the 
object and purpose of IIAs, the ISDS system should affirmatively encourage such suits by 
maintaining permissive rules on third-party funding.  
 
In this context, it is important to ask what impacts on government conduct may arise if we consider 
that third-party funding may increase the number of cases filed, may also lead to the filing of more 
marginal cases, and/or may affect outcomes of awards and settlements. As is briefly discussed 
below, in light of those and other issues, there are several reasons to suspect that third-party 
funding may exacerbate current concerns about undue regulatory chill 
 
Because investment law is a standards-based legal system, it can be extremely difficult for 
governments, in particular, to understand which claims have merit and what applicable damages 
                                                      
chemical manufacturer relating to a ban on certain cosmetic pesticides not through monetary compensation, but by 
issuing a statement indicating that the chemical in question does not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the 
environment when instructions on the label are followed.)  
146 Johnson et al. (n 10) 11-13 (this section summarizes the section on “reduced policy space” in that paper). 
147  Ibid 11-12 (looking at indirect expropriation and the evolution and application of the right to property to 
demonstrate how investment law as interpreted through ISDS decisions has tended to disfavor change and reallocation 
and instead emphasizes the importance of ensuring that investors and their investments are able to enjoy stability in 
legal rules, even when governments are regulating in good faith, for the public interest, and in compliance with 
domestic law). 
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may be. The resulting uncertainty in the law, exacerbated by the inconsistency of its application 
and the absence of a correcting mechanism, makes it extremely challenging and costly for 
governments to assess the likelihood that their conduct will conflict with treaty standards. Thus, 
such uncertainty and corresponding reputational and (highly enforceable) financial costs could 
discourage states from defending measures contested by investors through to awards and potential 
post-award phases.148  
 
Some governments may be more sensitive to regulatory chill than others. For example, those with 
limited resources to fund a robust defense and any potential liabilities, those that are more sensitive 
to any reputational costs, 149  or those that are dependent on other countries for development 
assistance, economic regulations or diplomatic support, may be less willing to contest claims,.150 
In such cases, investors may hold a relatively strong upper-hand in settlement negotiations, when 
the threat of an ISDS case looms. The presence of a third-party funder backing the suit may further 
tilt bargaining power in the claimant’s favor and induce a settlement that, even if not causing the 
government to abandon the measure, increases its cost of maintaining it, which may deter the 
government from taking similar action in the future. A government, for instance, may not back 
down on its decision to halt a mining project in light of social and environmental concerns; but the 
financial cost of a resulting ISDS settlement may discourage the government from similarly 
responding to environmental and social issues when they arise around other proposed projects.   
 
Additionally, even if a government decides not to settle and to pursue its case, the presence of a 
third-party funder, as noted above, may make it more likely that the government will lose and have 
to pay for adopting and/or maintaining the challenged measure. That, in turn, make it more costly 
– and potentially prohibitively costly – for the government to keep the measure in force post-
dispute, or to adopt similar measures in the future.  
 
Finally, impacts of third-party funding on government conduct and issues of regulatory chill may 
be more systemic. The overriding objective for funders is, in short, to maximize returns on 
investment in ISDS cases. There is no evidence that they filter claims based on the nature of the 
conduct challenged – e.g., by deciding not to pursue claims that arise out of complex policy 
decisions and good faith conduct taken for legitimate public purposes. Thus, third-party funders 
raise the risks of ISDS claims even for governments considering adopting public interest measures; 
and the defense costs, reputational harms, and potential liability associated with those claims may 
deter governments from taking relevant action in the first place. One law firm notes, for example, 
that “for every investor-State case that goes through to completion, there are several instances 
where companies have used IIAs as leverage to negotiate with the host government and cause it to 
change its behavior more quickly and less expensively.”151 Similarly, to the extent that third-party 
                                                      
148  Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 127 (citing Kyla Tienharra, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A 
View from Political Science’ in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011) 606, 615. 
149 The mere filing of an ISDS claim may decrease a respondent state’s attractiveness as a site for FDI, and if the state 
loses, the decrease may even be more significant. Allee & Peinhart (n 33). 
150  Bonnitcha (n 148) 118-27. 
151 Crowell & Moring, ‘How Mining Companies Can Mitigate Risks and Protect their Investments, Part I: International 
Investment Agreements’ (2014) <https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/How-Mining-
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funders are actually seeking to and effective in developing the law in funder- and claimant-friendly 
ways, that can have the eventual effect of narrowing the circumstances when governments can feel 
comfortable that their considered conduct will not trigger claims.  
 
This issues regarding regulatory chill and the overdeterrence of government behavior are already 
identified concerns about the ISDS system more generally.152 But the presence of third-party 
funding appears to exacerbate the concerns. It allows more speculative claims to be advanced as it 
eliminates risk to the claimant of advancing them; it signals to governments that such claimants 
have resources available to mount a well-prepared claim, and to see that claim through an award 
and potential post-award processes, including resubmission of the claim in a new proceeding; and 
it can shift outcomes and the law in ways that are favorable to funders (and claimants), but blind 
to more systemic policy questions such as when and how legal systems should require 
governments to pay for, and enable private actors to profit from, different types of “misconduct” 
of government actors and entities. 
3.3.2 Impacts on governance of certain types of investments 
 
The implications of third-party funding and ISDS claims for governments and governance are not 
necessarily the same across sectors and industries. As was noted above, for instance, investments 
in the extractive industries and long-term infrastructure projects are apparently linked to relatively 
heightened risks of claims, and heightened damage awards, and may be particularly attractive to 
third-party funders due to their large potential payouts.153  
 
Additionally, the impacts of investments in these industries present potentially transformative 
opportunities but also corresponding threats for host countries (and investors), and the extent to 
which gains are maximized and harms avoided is due in large part to the legal and policy 
frameworks in place to manage the projects.  Thus, it is exceedingly important to understand how 
ISDS and third-party funding of ISDS claims can impact governance of projects, including 
governments’ willingness and ability to regulate, and the costs governments may incur in adopting 
and maintaining regulations that are challenged by investors and seen as giving rise to viable 
claims by funders. ISDS claims in these sectors often stem from regulations or actions taken by a 
government  to respond to concerns about potential negative social, economic and environmental 
effects of projects, including concerns raised by communities surrounding extractive industry 
projects, or users of services provided by infrastructure investors.154 To the extent that funders are 
funding more of these extremely socially complicated kinds of cases, and increasing the resources 
and interests dedicated to protecting capital in the face of competing claims, there may be 
                                                      
Companies-Can-Mitigate-Risks-and-Protect-their-Investments-Part-I-International-Investment-Agreements> 
accessed Mar. 20, 2019. 
152 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (n 2) paras 36, 37. 
153  ICSID, ‘The ICSID Caseload – Statistics’ (Issue 2018-2) (2018) 28 (including Oil, Gas & Mining (21%); 
Information & Communication (5%); Transportation (2%); Construction (11%); Water, Sanitation & Flood Protection 
(4%); Electric Power & Other Energy (16%). See Hart (n 108) 8-10 (including a ranking of top 30 claims/damages 
awards as of 2014). 
154 See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula & Mika Schröder, ‘Community Perspectives in Investor-State Arbitration’ (IIED, 2017). 
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undesirable systemic implications on the broader set of voices and interests impacted by 
investment treaties, and governments’ willingness and ability to respond to them.155  
3.3.3 Impacts on certain respondent states 
 
Not all states face the same exposure to and challenges from third-party funding. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that third-party funders have little or no interest in funding claims against states 
that have substantial resources and talent to present a strong defense to an ISDS claim, or against 
states that are highly impoverished and will be unable to pay even a small fraction of an eventual 
award.156 This suggests that it may be middle-income countries, and countries that are relative 
novices at handling ISDS cases, that are particularly attractive targets. Additionally, countries that 
are reliant upon resource extraction as a development strategy, or private investment in 
infrastructure to compensate for limited public budgets and thin capital markets, may figure 
prominently on funders’ radars, especially if the regulatory frameworks governing either are 
relatively nascent, changing, and/or a bubbling source of controversy. As and to the extent these 
countries’ legal frameworks evolve to, for example, better capture tax revenue from natural 
resource projects,157 more meaningfully recognize indigenous communities’ rights to free prior 
and informed consent,158 ratchet up environmental protections or otherwise address environmental 
issues or concerns,159 or resist investors’ requests to increase tariffs or reduce service obligations 
in infrastructure projects,160 they risk being the object of an ISDS claim under the substantive 
standards contained in most IIAs.  
                                                      
155 Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement’ (2018) 7 TEL 729; Julia Brown, ‘International Investment Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the 
Face of Litigious Heat?’ 3(1) West. J. Legal Stud.; Gus van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, ‘Investment Treaties and 
Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada’ (2016) 7 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 92. 
156 At the Columbia University roundtable, one participant stated that funders are unlikely to fund ISDS claims against 
respondent states that are likely to prevail, such as the United States or Sweden, or against deeply impoverished states 
because of enforcement concerns, or otherwise. ICCA-QM Report (n 1) 244 (Annex C).  
157 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips and Perenco v. Vietnam (not public); Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Vietnam faces unusual BIT 
arbitration, with seller and purchaser of assets teaming up to file a joint claim in face of country’s threat to impose a 
capital gains tax’ IAReporter (Apr. 3, 2018) (describing a claim brought by two subsidiaries of ConocoPhillips and 
Perenco, respectively, regarding Vietnam’s intention to impose a form of capital gains tax on the sale of an investment). 
See also George Turner, ‘ConocoPhillips and Perenco try to stop £140m levy from sale of oilfields in key case for tax 
avoidance for multinationals’ The Guardian (Aug. 15, 2018). 
158 See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (November 30, 2017).  
159 Pending cases include, e.g., Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania Limited, Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Limited, EcoDevelopment 
in Europe AB, EcoEnergy Africa AB v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/33; Kingsgate 
Consolidated Ltd. v. The Kingdom of Thailand (not public); Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/15/2; Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41; Galway Gold Inc. v. 
Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/13; Red Eagle Exploration Limited v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/18/12; Cosigo Resources, Ltd., Cosigo Resources Sucursal Colombia, Tobie Mining and Energy, Inc. 
v. Republic of Colombia (not public); Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5). Decisions in favor of 
claimant (or settled) include, e.g., Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (March 17, 2015) and Award on Damages (Jan. 10, 2019); TransCanada Corporation 
and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. The United States of America, Order of the Secretary-General Taking Note of 
the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21 (March 24, 2017). Decisions in favor of state 
(including on jurisdiction) include, e.g., The Renco Group, Inc. v. Republic of Peru, Final Award, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/13/ (Nov. 9, 2016); Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Final Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12 (Oct. 14, 2016). 
160  TECO Guatemala Holdngs v. Guatemala, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, (December 19, 2013). 
(Guatemala’s subsequent application to annul was unsuccessful; the claimant was successful in a request for partial 
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If funders are in fact more likely to fund claims against some governments than others, this has 
several important implications. It may result in patterns whereby some countries – countries that 
have faced or are likely to face third-party-funder supported claims – are more familiar with the 
impacts of such funding and more interested than others in supporting restraints on such litigation 
finance practices. (Additionally, if funders and the funding industry are concentrated in certain 
states, this may result in patterns whereby the funders’ home countries resist regulation). To the 
extent that bilateral or multilateral solutions are necessary to address concerns about third-party 
funding, the unequal distribution of third-party funding’s costs and benefits across treaty parties 
may mean that the practice will continue notwithstanding the objections of particularly exposed 
and negatively impacted states. 
 
Additionally, to the extent that the presence of funding has an impact on ISDS decisions and 
settlement outcomes, disparate patterns of funder engagement may cause different states to have 
disparate experiences with investment law and ISDS that are not due to the contents of underlying 
treaties or the strength of the merits, but the resources, knowledge and networks of litigating 
parties.161 This, in turn, may magnify questions about the overall legitimacy of the system. 
 
These dynamics overlay similar dynamics that arise with ISDS more generally. While the treaties 
are, on paper, reciprocal between treaty parties, investment flows between treaty parties tend to 
still be largely one-way, meaning that treaties and ISDS are asymmetrical in practice, with some 
treaty parties more routinely or exclusively on the defense than others. The international 
investment law regime already has a lopsided impact on states in the developing world, who are 
the primary targets of investor claims (relative to GDP or government budgets) and who have 
already paid significantly more in damages than advanced economies.162 If third-party funding 
skews toward claims against countries or groups of countries already facing a disproportionate 
share of ISDS cases, this may exacerbate ISDS’s asymmetrical effects.   
 
Given these issues, it is important to understand if certain countries or certain country profiles, 
such as developing and middle-income countries, or countries with FDI concentrated in particular 
sectors and activities, are the primary targets of funded claims. If funders are fueling more cases 
against certain groups respondent states, the systemic impacts on sustainable development and 
equality before the law could be severe.  
4 POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Whatever its role or value in other legal frameworks or fora, third-party funding in ISDS is unique. 
Arguments about the “need” for third-party funding in ISDS to ensure “access to justice” both 
seem to overstate the “need” for this particular form of support and the role of ISDS in ensuring 
“access to justice”. Moreover, the asymmetrical nature of ISDS fundamentally distorts the ability 
                                                      
annulment, Decision on Annulment, April 5, 2016); but see Iberdrola v. Guatemala, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/5 (August 17, 2012) (Iberdrola’s subsequent application for annulment was unsuccessful) and Decision on 
Annulment (January 13, 2015).  
161 See discussion supra, Section 3.2.3 ‘Impacts on Decisions to Settle Claims’.  
162 Gallagher & Shrestha (n 135). This is one reason Frank Garcia characterizes third-party funding in ISDS as 
deliberately and systemically exploitative.  Frank J. Garcia, ‘Third-Party Funding as Exploitation of the Investment 
Treaty System’ (2018) 59 B.C.L. Rev. 2911. 
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of third-party funding to help level playing fields and create market efficiencies. Instead, third-
party funding may exacerbate problems with underlying investment standards and the ISDS 
mechanism, and introduces a new actor into the ISDS system with its own incentives for 
challenging, inter alia, the type of robust government regulation that is needed to advance 
sustainable development objectives. In short, the value of third-party funding to actors other than 
funders and some claimants has not yet been made clear, while the risks are increasingly apparent.  
 
Importantly, various states, arbitral institutions, and other international organizations, such as 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, are now analyzing third-party funding in ISDS, and considering 
what, if anything, should and can be done about it. However, a failure to use these processes to 
adequately identify and grapple with the myriad issues raised by the practice will allow for 
continued expansion of funders and funding and make future regulatory action even more 
challenging. 
 
It is sometimes asserted (particularly by funders) that regulation is not necessary; either existing 
regulations on claimants and lawyers, as well as those generally placed on funders who are publicly 
traded, or banking entities, are sufficient.163 Or simply that funders self-regulate as an industry.164 
With respect to the first form, regulation of financial and banking entities does not address the 
public policy concerns from the perspectives set forth in this paper. With respect to the second 
form, it is difficult to envision how industry self-regulation would be systemically possible when 
incentives for profit-seeking behavior are so strong and particularly as more and more funders 
enter the field and are in competition for these profits. Given that levels of transparency regarding 
funding terms and funded ISDS cases are particularly low it would seemingly be impossible, even 
within the industry, to know when third-party funders are violating any kind of hypothetical self-
regulation in the first place. Moreover, a key aspect of effective regulation is, ultimately, the threat 
or imposition of sanctions for wrongdoing, which does not currently exist in the third-party funding 
sector. Presumably, then, notions of self-regulation mean that the market self-regulates; no funder 
can survive if it does not make a profit, and that means choosing strong, viable cases. Putting aside 
the fact that financial success and ethical regulation are not the same thing (and indeed, the former 
often comes at the expense of the latter), funders that ultimately do not earn a sufficient financial 
return to stay in business can inflict harm in specific cases in the interim. This is not an insignificant 
concern, particularly for the respondent states that may be most impacted by funding arrangements. 
 
There are thus two options for policy makers: ban it or regulate it. 
 
4.1 BAN THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN FULL OR IN PART 
 
Calls for third-party funding to be banned in its entirety in ISDS are primarily based on the 
recognition that it offers very few, if any, benefits but introduces serious and systemic costs to 
states and other stakeholders.165 Proponents of a ban often recognize that whatever its merits in 
                                                      
163  E.g. Letter from Burford to Senators Charles E. Grassley and John Cornyn (September 25, 2015) 
<http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/burford-submits-response-to-us-senators/> accessed March 18, 2019).  
164 Ibid.  
165 Frank J. Garcia, ‘The Case Against Third-Party Funding in Investment Arbitration’ (July 30, 2018) Investment 
Treaty News <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/07/30/the-case-against-third-party-funding-in-investment-arbitration-
frank-garcia/> accessed April 29, 2019; Frank Garcia and Kirrin Hough, ‘Third Party Funding in International 
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traditional litigation and commercial arbitration, third-party funding has no place in investment 
arbitration, at least as long as long as IIAs and ISDS continue to possess certain features, including 
extreme asymmetry, substantive reliance on standards as opposed to clear rules, relatively easily 
jurisdictional access to ISDS, and a general failure to sanction frivolous claims at either the merits 
or damages phase. Frank Garcia has, for example, asserted that as long as third-party funders are 
operating within a system that is as unbalanced as ISDS, where states have no substantive rights 
under the treaties, claimants have a direct voice in the selection of arbitrators, and there is no right 
of appeal, third-party funding is “to put it bluntly, an exploitation… defined as a form of ‘unfair 
advantage-taking.’”166 Pursuant to Garcia’s arguments, allowing speculative finance to take a stake 
in the outcome of ISDS cases, to have a voice in or influence over which arbitrators are chosen, 
and when and for how much cases will settle, deliberately exploits deep-rooted flaws in the 
investment treaty system for the benefit of capital and at the expense of governments, taxpayers 
and citizens.167  
 
States, too, have called for a ban on third-party funding in ISDS. For example, several states in the 
context of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on ISDS reform have suggested that a complete ban 
may be necessary to address the broad concerns caused by third-party funding in ISDS. 168 
Argentina and the United Arab Emirates have gone one step further and actually included a ban in 
                                                      
Investor-State Arbitration’ (Nov. 1, 2018) ASIL Insights 22(16) 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/16/third-party-funding-international-investor-state-arbitration 
accessed April 29, 2019. 
166 Garcia (n 165). 
167 The fact that in ISDS the respondent state taxpayers alone are the residual risk-bearers, as opposed to third-party 
funding in the commercial arbitration context where both sides’ shareholders bear the residual risk of adverse 
judgments, is another reason that third-party funding in ISDS must be distinguished from other contexts.  Garcia (n 
165).   
168  See e.g. Working Group III 35th Session, Audio recordings (April 25, 2018) 
<https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/a2ad492b-22e9-497c-93c8-4be3130e9978> accessed 
April 29, 2019.  Nigeria stated that third-party funding “[r]aises a moral, ethical and public policy issues why a total 
stranger who has suffered no injury should be allowed to benefit from the injury caused to others…” and after noting 
systemic concerns surrounding third-party funding, including an increase in frivolous or unmeritorious claims and 
impacts on settlements, suggested that increased transparency or an outright ban may be considered to deal with these 
concerns. [10:49:26]. Burkina Faso noted the ethical and other concerns regarding third-party funding in ISDS said 
that potential regulations, or a ban may be an appropriate result. [16:25:59]. Kenya raised the question of whether 
third-party funding should be banned in ISDS.  [16:28:31]. South Africa, noting the increase in funding of non-
pecunious investors, the financial value of claims being funded, and the targeting of certain profiles of countries, along 
with the significant impact that funders can have on case management and settlement, called for third-party funding 
to be seriously addressed, and noted Kenya’s call for a detailed analysis as to what can be done, including a ban, or a 
very comprehensive transparency requirement including the terms of the funding agreement and ethical requirements 
[16:46:23]. India stated “third-party funding… has the potential to derail the system from its very objective of 
providing justice.” [10:24:31]. Working Group III 37th Session, Audio recordings (April 1, 2019) < 
https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/9e4160d4-6cef-4de6-83c0-d9c4645bf253> accessed 
April 30, 2019. Uruguay noted that given the option between regulation and a ban it supports regulation, and if banning 
third-party funding were not difficult, this is the option that it would choose. [12:06:31]. Morocco raised concerns 
about the possibility of speculative and abusive use of third-party funding by investors and while awaiting the adoption 
of rules that could effectively regulate third-party funding, propose a ban on third-party funding in context of 
UNCITRAL reform. [12:10:15]. Argentina intervened to remind delegations that a ban remains on the table. 
[12:28:20]. 
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their 2018 bilateral investment treaty.169 And, as noted above, the United States bans third-party 
funding of domestic claims against the federal government.  
 
To the extent states and arbitral institutions choose not to ban third-party funding, the impact that 
it can have on investment treaty arbitration and the various policy aims and interests it can impact 
strongly suggests introduction of comprehensive regulation that is meaningfully crafted to avoid 
the unintended and undesirable effects caused by third-party funding in ISDS.  
 
4.2 REGULATE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
 
When it comes to regulating third-party funding and third-party funders, there is a wide range of 
possibilities. Opinions about the need for various regulatory options will likely be rooted in and 
dependent on differences in perceptions about the various concerns surrounding third-party 
funding as well as what desirable policy responses should be.170 
 
For example, if potential conflicts of interest as between arbitrators and funders are the only 
concern, it may be sufficient to mandate disclosure of the existence of funding and the identity of 
the funder (which should also include information about relevant actors in the corporate family). 
If the concern about third-party funding relates to the role of the funder in situations in which states 
struggle to enforce awards for costs, rules on security for costs may be desirable, and, particularly 
in the case of potentially impecunious claimants, the ability to understand when and under what 
circumstances the funder has a contractual obligation to fulfill a cost award, and relatedly, what 
rights the funder has to terminate the funding agreement, might also be useful.171 
 
Additionally, if the concern surrounds the ability of the funder to exercise influence or control over 
the management of the claim, rules limiting such roles would be important.172 Here it is helpful to 
note that an important distinction between contingency fee or pro bono arrangements on the one 
hand, and more traditional forms of third-party funding (i.e. non-recourse financial interest in the 
outcome of a case) on the other, is that in the former case the “funder” is itself subject to external 
                                                      
169 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Argentine Republic and the 
United Arab Emirates (signed 16 April 2018, not yet in force) art 24: Third Party Funding (“Third party funding is 
not permitted.). 
170 Funders themselves are not necessarily opposed to some forms of regulation. IMF Bentham, for example, explains 
“The dispute financing industry is in the process of reform in many of the jurisdictions in which we operate. We expect 
and embrace change and so we have welcomed the regulatory reviews and oversight that are taking place, and indeed 
have long called for appropriate regulation as our industry matures and expands to the mainstream.” IMF Bentham (n 
30) 20. 
171 Of course, liability for adverse cost awards could be built into any third-party funding transaction – everything has 
a price. However, funders rightly note that if they are forced to take the step of collateralizing these contractual 
obligations, either through escrow or a guarantee, this would significantly impact their business model – money in 
escrow or booked as a liability is not otherwise being used to earn a much higher return in another investment.   
172 See Steinitz (n 112) 1327-1330. Hong Kong’s regulations surrounding third-party funding require the extent of 
control that the funder may exercise to be included in the funding agreement. Code of Practice for Third Party Funding 
of Arbitration, Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, No. 6, (2017), § 98(U) (“The funding agreement shall set out 
clearly: (1) that the third-party funder will not seek to influence the funded party or the funded party’s legal 
representative to give control or conduct of the arbitration to the third-party funder except to the extent permitted by 
law; (2) that the third-party funder will not take any steps that cause or are likely to cause the funded party’s legal 
representative to act in breach of professional duties; and (3) that the third-party funder will not seek to influence the 
arbitration body and any arbitral institution involved.”). 
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ethical and other regulations that prevents it from engaging in exploitative behavior.173 Lawyers 
are held to ethical standards by their bar, which include fiduciary obligations to act in their client’s 
best interest. Third-party funders are not subject to this kind of oversight or regulation. While they 
do have obligations to their shareholders (in the form of maximizing profit) that may align with 
the interest of the funded party, this alignment of interests will not be true in all cases.  Enforceable 
ethical rules may need to be developed regarding the attorney-client-funder relationship to ensure 
that funding structures are more fundamentally focused on the client’s interest.174  
 
In addition to suggesting that certain ethical duties be imposed on funders’ relationships with 
funded parties, Maya Steinitz has also suggested that consumer protection and contract-design 
principles may be desirable to incorporate into funding agreements, that courts (or tribunals) 
should have supervision over relationships with funders, and that securities regulations should be 
tailored to address secondary markets in funded claims, among other helpful suggestions.175 
 
Some early efforts to address the regulation (as opposed to ban) of third-party funding in ISDS 
have focused on these issues of conflicts and control. Singapore and Hong Kong, which otherwise 
ban third-party funding, have crafted regulations to permit, and regulate, third-party funding in 
arbitration.176 These jurisdictions impose ethical obligations related to funding, and also require 
that the existence and identity of the funder be disclosed to the tribunal and other parties, with the 
ability of the tribunal to order disclosure of the funding agreement in certain contexts.177 Hong 
Kong has also recently addressed the issue of control, generally prohibiting the funder from 
exercising control over the arbitration to the extent permitted by law.178 ICSID has proposed in the 
current draft of its rule revision proposal a requirement for a party to disclose the existence of 
funding and identity of the funder to the tribunal. It is possible that certain aspects of the funding 
agreement could be disclosed in certain circumstances.179  
                                                      
173 Steinitz (n 112) at 1327-30. 
174 Ibid 1326. 
175 Ibid. 
176 At least one third-party funder actively and publicly lobbied for these changes. Burford, 2017 Annual Report (n 
63) 11 (“Until 2017, both Hong Kong and Singapore had prohibited litigation finance (except in insolvency), and 
indeed any form of risk-based litigation activity, including lawyers taking risk on their own fees. However, following 
significant education and lobbying by Burford, both jurisdictions passed legislation in 2017 that enabled litigation 
finance for arbitration.”) 
177 In Singapore, the tribunal may order disclosure of certain details of the funding agreement “where appropriate, 
details of the third‐party funder’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and/or whether or not the third‐party 
funder has committed to undertake adverse costs liability.” SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules 2017, Article 24(L). 
Pursuant to the Hong Kong Code of Practice for Third Party Funding of Arbitration, “the funded party to an arbitration 
does not have any obligation to disclose details of the funding agreement except as required by the funding agreement, 
or as ordered by the arbitration body in an arbitration, or as otherwise required by law.” Supra note 104, Art 2.11. 
178 Code of Practice for Third Party Funding of Arbitration, Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, No. 6, (2017), § 98(U) 
(“The funding agreement shall set out clearly: (1) that the third party funder will not seek to influence the funded party 
or the funded party’s legal representative to give control or conduct of the arbitration to the third party funder except 
to the extent permitted by law; (2) that the third party funder will not take any steps that cause or are likely to cause 
the funded party’s legal representative to act in breach of professional duties; and (3) that the third party funder will 
not seek to influence the arbitration body and any arbitral institution involved.”). 
179 The ICSID amendment proposal addresses third-party funding in Rule 13. ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the 
ICSID Rules, Working Paper #2, Volume 1 (March 2019). Paragraph 139 explains: “Some commentators suggested 
that AR 13 should require disclosure of the entire funding agreement. AR 13 requires disclosure of the fact of funding 
and the name of the funder only, as nothing further is required to achieve the purpose of the rule, avoidance of conflicts 
of interest. This approach is in line with current treaty practice and most other arbitration rules that address this topic. 
  42 
 
Beyond the issues of conflict and control, it is important to consider whether there are other 
regulatory options that might help ensure that the incentives and conduct of funders (and other 
actors in the system) align with the object and purpose of investment treaties. While, for instance, 
rules mandating disclosure of the identity of the funder may make it easier to identify conflicts of 
interest or other problematic relationships between arbitrators and specific funders, transparency 
alone will not address more systemic conflicts. For example, if a law firm derives secondary 
benefits because a client has received funding to advance an ISDS claim, certain conflicts may 
arise in cases where other law firm partners are either representing states or serving as arbitrators. 
Will such respondent counsel be as willing to argue, or such arbitrators as willing to decide, issues 
adverse to the interests of their claimant clients, including, for example, that third-party funders’ 
interests are not “investments” the treaties were designed to protect and so are not entitled to 
recover under the treaty, or that third-party funders must themselves qualify as “investors” in order 
to successfully advance claims? These types of structural conflicts would not be resolved by 
disclosure of the existence of the funder, the funding agreement, or prohibitions on control. Rather, 
there would need to be other approaches, such as clear ethical rules on imputation of conflicts of 
interests. 
 
Related issues that regulation of third-party funding could address relate to whether it is consistent 
with the treaties to: 
• permit funders and funding models that encourage arbitration, provide broad rights of 
standing and broad interpretations of substantive standards, and push for large awards for 
expectation damages; 
• permit funders and funding arrangements to exacerbate the asymmetries in power between 
the claimant and respondent in many ISDS disputes; 
• create an industry of funders (separate from and in addition to individual claimants, 
attorneys, experts and arbitrators) that profits from and is likely to push (via lobbying and 
arbitration) for third-party-funding-friendly rules on standing, liability, and damages; and 
• make it feasible and attractive for the FDI (or other) investor to monetize and sell its interest 
in a potential ISDS claim against the country in which it had invested. 
 
Additional considerations relate to impact of funding on flows of investment across borders, and 
taxation of those flows. In an era when tackling problems of base erosion and profit shifting180 
have gained heightened attention and urgency at national and international levels, and as 
policymakers and implementers are struggling to improve domestic resource mobilization and put 
in place human-rights aligned tax policies and practices,181 is it appropriate to permit third-party 
funders to secure payouts from public funds, while structuring their investments across affiliates 
                                                      
If the disclosure of further information about the third-party funding arrangement becomes relevant to another aspect 
of the proceeding, Tribunals have discretion under the general rules on evidence to order disclosure of relevant 
materials.” 
180 More information available on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS at <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/>. 
181 See e.g. Olivier De Schutter, ‘Taxing for the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (May 2017) 
Institute for Interdisciplinary Research in Legal sciences (JUR-I), Center for Philosophy of Law (CPDR), CRIDHO 
Working Paper 2017/1; Center for Economic and Social Rights, ‘Challenging Fiscal Abuse and Promoting Human 
Rights-Aligned Tax Policies’ <http://www.cesr.org/human-rights-taxation> accessed April 29, 2019. 
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and borders in ways that result in them paying absurdly low taxes (to any and all relevant 
governments).182 
 
Overall, as discussed in this paper, there are a range of concerns about third-party funding that go 
beyond issues of case-specific conflicts of interest and protection of the claimant in the claimant-
attorney-funder relationship. These include third-party funding’s potential to generate inordinate 
costs for developing states, its ability to impact outcomes in particular cases and to shift the 
boundaries of the law in more funder- and/or claimant-friendly ways, its impact on incentives to 
sue and related retention of FDI, and its propensity to exacerbate situations of regulatory chill and 
overdeterrence. In light of these issues, it is crucial to fully explore the actual and potential, positive 
and negative, intentional and unintentional, and discrete and systematic effects of third-party 
funding in ISDS, and consider a ban, or regulations, that address and avoid unwanted outcomes. 
While initiatives such as ICSID’s have thus far failed to take on this challenge, the ongoing process 
in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on ISDS reform appears to be poised to take a more 
comprehensive look at a much broader range of concerns, with an outcome that may be 
correspondingly broad to thoroughly address them.183 Other states may similarly be exploring and 
addressing these issues in much greater depth on a bi- or multi-lateral basis.184 
 
4.3 PRACTICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
Efforts to ban or regulate third-party funding will likely face hurdles and resistance. Supporters of 
the practice, for instance, argue for regulatory inaction or limited action on the ground that there 
is not adequate information about the practice to identify problems or propose solutions.185 It may 
be said, for instance, that the negative outcomes highlighted in this paper are largely theoretical 
and anecdotal, and are not widely documented; it may also be said that, as discussed above, rather 
than raising concerns, third-party funding plays a valuable social role in terms of leveling the 
playing field between disputing parties, ensuring that those harmed have their day in “court”, and 
helping produce sound outcomes. Testing these pro and con arguments is undoubtedly desirable, 
and also undoubtedly difficult given the opacity surrounding the extent and nature of funders’ 
involvement in ISDS cases. But the lack of data should not be a barrier to regulatory action. Given 
that it is funders who hold the information that would be crucial for dispelling concerns about, and 
demonstrating the value of, their practices, and that funders have not disclosed such information, 
the presumption should be that the concerns are valid. Unavailability of information should not be 
used to justify a laissez-faire approach when it is the potentially regulated entity that holds, but 
opts not to provide, the relevant information.  
 
                                                      
182 E.g. Burford anticipates that its long-term tax rates will be in the low teens. 2018 Annual Report (n 27) 45. See 
also IMF Bentham (n 30) 74-76.  
183 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (n 2). 
184 E.g. Argentina and the United Arab Emirates ban third-party funding in their recent bilateral investment treaty. 
Argentina/UAE treaty (n 169) art 24. 
185 In their respective submissions to ICSID relating to ICSID’s arbitration rules revision process, for instance, Vannin 
Capital, Burford Capital, and Woodsford Litigation Funding, third-party funders of ISDS cases, stated that proposed 
rules requiring disclosures of the existence and identities of funders were unnecessary as there were not any known 
cases were third-party-funding-related conflicts were found to exist. Those submissions are available on ICSID’s 
website <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Pages/Public%20Inputs/input.aspx> accessed April 16, 2019.  
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Another argument that has been used to dismiss efforts to ban and/or regulate third-party funding 
in ISDS is that, given the challenges in defining precisely what it is we are talking about, and the 
sophisticated nature of funders whose products evolve and quickly cross definitional lines,186 it 
will be difficult if not impossible to articulate what it is that is banned or regulated. According to 
some, it is therefore better to do little or nothing than to seek to regulate an amorphous and 
constantly-shifting form of financing where the industry will outpace the regulators.187 Yet while 
it may be the case that the third-party financing industry, motivated by extreme levels of profit, 
has incentives to invest substantial resources to elude regulatory oversight, this is a poor reason to 
do nothing or to limit regulatory ambitions.  
 
It is also argued that due to the atomized, multi-jurisdictional nature of ISDS and the entities and 
jurisdictions that do (and do not) govern it, regulatory efforts will be futile and/or hopelessly 
complicated. Indeed, part of the hurdle of regulating and enforcing prohibitions of or sanctions 
against third-party funding in ISDS is that the laws and policies of multiple jurisdictions may be 
relevant in any given case, including but not limited to: the home country jurisdiction of the funder, 
the jurisdiction where the investor is incorporated, the jurisdiction of the funding vehicle (along 
with any interim jurisdictions in the corporate structure), the host-country jurisdiction, the 
jurisdiction of the seat of the arbitration, and the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. To the 
extent some jurisdictions and not others implement some form of regulation (or even less formal 
public policy opposition), the ease of jurisdiction-shopping means that funders may be able to use 
creative corporate structures to avoid or mitigate oversight. Moreover, to the extent arbitration 
rules mandate different levels of transparency or regulation of third-party funders, claimants may 
take this into account when choosing under which rules to arbitrate. While the multijurisdictional 
aspect of ISDS is indeed a challenge, the challenge of regulating financial services and industries 
is not limited to third-party funding, but is a task put to regulators worldwide in many multi-
jurisdictional contexts. Collective efforts by states, arbitral institutions, and other actors involved 
in policy making and enforcement,188 can result in shared understanding of acceptable practices 
and can produce rules capable of achieving regulatory objectives. And even in the absence of full 
consensus on the problems that need to be addressed and the appropriate way forward for doing 
so, and even without certainty that foolproof mechanisms will ultimately be identified for 
preventing regulatory arbitrage and races to the bottom, 189  it is nevertheless important to 
thoughtfully address issues and options. These arguments reflect real challenges, but they do not 
justify a do-nothing approach. As we have learned from other forms of financial services regulation, 
definitions and sanctions are possible where there is a will to construct and enforce them. 
                                                      
186 See, e.g., Vannin Capital and Burford Capital (n 185) (discussing how the proposed definition of did not reflect the 
current state of the sophisticated and complex litigation finance market). 
187 See Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2014) 192-194. 
188 Effectively banning third-party funding in ISDS will likely require a multi-pronged approach that would require 
bans (and enforcement thereof) by arbitral institutions, in treaties themselves, and also at the domestic level with 
respect to ethical rules governing lawyers as well as domestic law, particularly where such law applies as the seat of 
arbitration or jurisdiction of enforcement. 
189 As David Gaukrodger has indicated, arbitration institutions may be competing for business from investors, and 
such competition may encourage them to adopt rules, practices and policies more favorable to investor claimants. 
David Gaukrodger, ‘Appointing Authorities and the Selection of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An 
Overview’ (March 2018) OECD Consultation Paper, 12-16 (discussing some key features of arbitration institutions 
and the possibility and implications of competition among them). Thus, it is not inconceivable that some institutions 
will decline to discipline the practice of third-party funding on the ground that liberal rules regarding its use will result 
in more claims being brought to their facilities.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
Third-party funding in ISDS raises a host of policy issues that are specific to this unique context. 
Thus, justifications for third-party funding that may apply in other fora do not necessarily apply in 
this particular area of claims and liability. While certain initiatives are exploring and addressing 
important issues that arise with respect to third-party funding in the ISDS context, such as conflicts 
of interests and security for costs, there is a series of more systemic concerns that merit further 
attention and analysis. Initiatives to date have failed to adequately assess the costs and benefits of 
third-party funding against the objectives of the treaty system the objectives of which it purports 
to, or should, advance.  
 
This paper has set forth issues that should be of paramount importance to states and other 
stakeholders as they consider whether and how to regulate or ban third-party funding in ISDS. 
There are serious causes for concern about its impacts on investors’ incentives, on respondent 
states’ exposure, liability, and responses to ISDS claims, and on the investment law system itself. 
In the absence of information to dispel these concerns, and in light of the fact that funders hold 
much of the information relevant for a deeper analysis of the issues, precaution should govern 
policy approaches.190  
 
To date, the only parties that third-party funding seems to be benefiting are the investment law bar, 
claimants, and funders themselves. As arbitrator Gavan Griffith bluntly stated, from the 
perspective of a funder, third-party funding in ISDS is a “gambler’s Nirvana: Heads I win, tails 
you lose.”191 Whether the objectives of investment treaties and global economic development 
should be ceded to the profit motive of investment funds is a question of critical importance that 
must be addressed in the context of all ISDS reform discussions.  
 
 
 
                                                      
190 Garcia (n 162) 2930 (advocating precautionary approach to third-party funding regulation in view of potential risks 
and magnitude of funding already involved). 
191 RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs, Assenting 
reasons of Gavan Griffith, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10 (Aug. 13, 2014) 13. 
